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(I
Advances in digital computing technology make it possible to improve the design
of the Man Machine Interfa,oe (MMI), SCADA and ,,\LARM modules used in
electrical utility control centres. to overcome; the problem o('Oootrol staff data
overloading. A possible ~,olution is proposed, based on-an explicit representation
of a disturbed power system state in addition to quiescent conditions.
The structure of modem SCADA,inst81lations is\analysed ,interms of the
computing power of full graphic workstations, the quantities of element data
delivered to the control room and the capabilities of intelligent remote terrrina!
units. This analysis indicates that existing deSigns for the presentation of SCADA
qata need to change to solve the data overloadinq-problem.
The proposed philosophy moves the focusrpf attention from the element level u'p
to the device level by grouping and dividing all elements into categories at the
RTU and linking them to their parent device, Control staff are notified graphically
on the one-line displays, next to the device in question, of the existence of
abnormal elements by category. The element sta\l=ldetalls for the device are only
displayed on demand, resulting in a 95% redUlmior:iof alarm text messages.
Suggestions are made as to the software functions needed at tbe RTU and the
workstation to assist with the display of system data. Lastly racommendations are
offered to reduce maintenance by standardising ~nd pre-ordering device element
data.
iii
Acknowled9§!!!!ents
I would like to thank the members of ESKOM's National Control for their help and
support in preparing this document, in particular Mr. Len H~rvey, Mr. Robert
Gubbins, Mr. Emile Venter, the National Control Manager, rVtr.Charles Geldard,
the System Operations Manager, Mr. Juan La Grange for permission to publish
thls docurnent. I would like to express my appreciation to AnthCJnyBlake and Wally
Webb for their time and suggestions while proOf reading this document.
I would also like to thank Professor jan M. MacLeoci who acted as supervisor, for
his assistance and enthusiasm in preparing this report. .
iv
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
1.2 Problem Background
1.3 Alarm Messages
1.4 SCADA and MMI Oesign
1.5 Data Overloading Definition
1.6 Control Staff Disturbance Activity.
1.7 Importance Of The Rpsearch
1.8 Solution Options
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
1.9 Solution Objective
1.10 Picto('" 'l1~pof the project report
1.11 Overview of the project report
1.12 Summary
4
4
5
5
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Telemetered Data
2.3 Plant structure
2.4 Mental Models
2.5 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
2.6 Enhanced Remote Terminal Unit
2.7 ESTEL Protocol
2.8 Host Computer System
2.9 Data Base
2.10 Telecontrol Standard
2.11 Man Machine Interface
2.12 Summary
6
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
9
10
10
10
11
3. MMI RESEARCH REVIEW
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 Control Room Task Analysis
$.1.2 Control Staff Requirements
3.1.3 Regional Control Consideration
3. 'l.4 National Control Manager
3.1.5 SCADA Vendor Comments
3.1.6 Enhanced Remote Terminal Units
3.1.7 ESTEL Protocol
3.1.8 Telecontrol Standard
1.2
12
12
13
13
13
14
14
14
14
5 JUly, 1995 v
3.2 Summary 15
4. THE PROBLEM OF DATA OVERLOADiNG
4.1 IntroduCtion
4.2 Daily Tasks
4.3 Alarm Philosophy
4.4 Progress Message$
4.5 The Fire Hose Syndrome
4.6 Summary
16
16
16
16
17
18·
;>19
5. EVALUATION OF MMI LITERATURE
5.1 Introduction
5.2 General Philosophy
5.2.1 EPRI
5.2.2CIGRE
5.2.3 CDC
5.2.4 Dept. Of Electrical Engineering, Washington Univers~:r
5.2.SIEEE
5.2.6 Helander
5.3 Expert Systems
5.3.1 EDF
5.3.2 Portuquese
5.3.3 Hydro-Quebec
5.:),4 Strathclyde Univ~:;,,(y
5.3.5 SLJmmarypf;''::xpert Systems
5.4 Full Grap~:6.~
5.5 SU!O";rrlary
20
20
20
20
21
21
22
.12
22
23
23
23
23
23
24
24
25
o. POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE DATA OVERLOAD PROBLEM
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Disturbed state
6.3 Design Brief
6.4 Solution Mechanir..$
6.5 Proposed solution
6.6 Categories
6.6.1 MMI indication of abnormal element states
6.7 Abnormal counts
6.8 Text alarm messages
6.9 Data structure changes
6.10 Cummunication cycles
6,10,1 Communication network loading
26
26
26
26
26
27
27
28
28
~9
29
30
30
'.i JUly, 1995 vi
6.11 MMI Icons
6.11.1 Icon duration
6.11.2 Flashing icons
6.12 Additional Fields
6.12.1 AadiUonal Host. fields
6.12.2 Additional ERTU fields
6.13 Host changes
6.14 ERTU changes
6.15 Maintenance
6.15.1 Plant commissioning
6.16 Example
6.17 Summary
31
32
32
32
33
34
34
35
35
37
37
38
7. HOST MMI FUNCTIONS
1.1 Introduction
7.2 Data view philosophy
7.3 New·MMI Phi;bsophv
7.3.1 Output views
1.3..2. Input views
7.4 MMI Data flow
7.5 Output behaviour on display call-up
7.6 Input view areas
7.6.1 Category Filter
7.6,2 Alarm query
7.6.3 Secretary mode
7.6.4 Displa.y controls
7.7 One-line display representation
7.7.1 Voltage Colours
7.8 Viewing controls
'1.9 Summary
39
39
39
as
40
40
40
41
41
42
42
42
4~
4J
44
44
44
8. SECRETARY MODE FUNCTIONS
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Secre~ary actions
8.3 The role of intelligent systems
8.4 ERTU actlvitles
8.5 Host activities
8.6 Summary
45
45
45
45
46
47
47
9. JUSTIFICATION Or- THE SOLUTION AND EVALUATION Or- ALTERNA1nVES
9.1 Introduction
48
48
5 July. 1995 vii
9.2 Data Sase Increases
9.3 Installing new elements
9.4 CPU Lo~ding Consequences
904.1 Expected changes in the computing and electrical industry
9.5 Summary
48
48
49
49
50
10. CONCLUSI($N
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Evaluation ofthe new MMI
10.3 Concept model MMI
10.4 Prototype
10.5 Financial consequences
10.5.1 ERTI.iCosts
10.5.2 Host costs
10.5.3 Protocol costs
H).SA MMI costs
10.6 Responsibilities /'"
51
51
51
52
52
52
52
52
53
53
53
53
53
54
54
54
54
54
55
55
10.7lmplernelltation Plan
10.8 Critical Review Of This Report
10.8.1 Mental rrl:~dels
10.3.2 New knowledge
10.8.3 Support
10.8.4 Academic view
10.8.5 Advantages
10.8.S Disadvantages
10.9 Conclusions
Appendix 1 Examples of an ESKOM disturbance log.
Appendix 2 A copy of the 1994 ESKOM Teleccntrol Standard used to wire up Remote Termlnal Units.
Appendix 3 Task analysis of ESKOM's National Control Staff.
Appendix 4 Man Machine Interrace functionality comments and requirements.
,',
Appendix 5 Phase 3 protection element data for a Static Voltage Compensator.
Appendix 6 Glossary.
Appendix 7 Copies of character graphic displays used by ESKOM's National Control staff.
Appendlx s References.
5July,1995 vm
List of figu:res
Figure 1-1 fliotol'ial map ohhe project report ...
Figure 2-1 Pictenal View oflhe data path from th~ RTU to the controt room
Figure 2-2 Electrioal network struoture .
Figure 2-3 $ubstl:ltion ,and 8Rl'U interfacing structure
Figure 2-4 Host hardware configur~tion
, Figure 2-5 Ml;U haluware r:conflguration
Flgure 3-1 Arrangement of eonsoies in National Control
Figure 4-1 The fire nose analogy ..
Figure 4-2 Alarm rste.'fo!lowing a minordisturoance
Figure 4-'3q::lower system freql!lency; response
Figqre 6.,1 Existiri~'Bnd new face) levels
Figure 6"'G (13raphf~lmodel oftl:le proposed data structure
Figure ~-3 Comparison 01the .classlcal and proposed data strnctures
Figure si4 Modelof'tr.a two cycle data acquisition mode
Figure 6-0 da~egory loons and associated popup window
Figure 6-6 pte of pulse trace behaviour
Figure 6..'7>, 1'Ipleoft.l1e presence bit in use
Figure 7·1 MMI Work benct\ layout:
Figure 7~2 l,.()gicaldata.base1.fStructl.lres at thehost and workstations
Figure 7~aData flow When a djSPI~~lin called in to the work area
Figure 7-4 ~mple.of a,one~line display with grey out and icon indication::>
4
6
7
8
9
11
12
18
18
19;,
26
28
29
30
31
34
36
40
41
42
43
11 July. 1995 ix
List ofTabJes
Table 1 Typical format of alarm messages
Table 2 MMI Question topics
Table 3 Transformer breaker elements divided by category
Table 4 Hydro unit state change messages
Table 5 Transformer elements divided into categories
Table 6 Additional fields needed on aUhost deia base records
Table 7 Category field layout. .
Table 8 Comparison of the difference,~.sbetWeen classical and the new MMI.
Table 9 Elemtint difference.s betwee.x'jthe 1990 and .1904Telecontrol Standards
Table 10 List of devices per electlica! object
Table 11 List of devices per electric9~ object (continued)
Table 12 Evaluation of initial?fOhl:.1(tl in terms of the new MMI
1
13
15
17
27,
33
33
39
48
48
49
51
5 J~~!.".1995
r,INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
this chapter iUroduces the problem of data and alarm message overloading experienced
by staff in electrical utility control centres and examines the factors ~h~t make it a serious
problem that requires an immediate solution. It also provides. a pictorial map of the entire
project report.
1.2 Problem Background
The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCAOA) used to monitor
Electric8rPower Networks are designed to provide the control staff with up to date
inform~tkm on the current state ot the [lower netw01''<as rapidly as possible. This is to
ensure that problems detected in the power network are corrected as fast as possible to
prevent further degradation ofthe power supply to consumers,
Currently, control staff are notified of network problems via text messages, gef'!~rally
referred to as alarms or alarm messages, sentto them by the "alarm system" software.
1.3 Alarm Messages
Alarm messages indicate that a power system element has changed state or has crossed
a limit btlimdary. They are generated by the Host computer following the detection of the
change by the SCADA system, The text for the alarm message is inherent in the
definition of the element in the Host data base. Non-intelligent Remote Tenninal Units
(RTUs) are responsible for the collection and delivelY of the current element states
following. a request for data from the host. Therefore the RTU is ultimately r~;5ponsible for
the generation otthe alarm messages.
Each message seen by the C I)ntrol staff is actually very primitive. The current design of
SCADA and ALARM software apPlications only allows for messages that refer to a single
element at the RTU.
An alarm message is normally made up of 6 basic fields as can be seen in Table 1 e.g.
1. Time at which the event occurred
2, Priority of the message from 1 to 6 with 1 high
3. station initiating the alarm
4. Name of the device or element to which the message belongs
5. Element 10 in alarm if the device has more than one element
6. Alarm state, LOW, High, Normal or Alarm. For analogue alarms the message also
includes the value and limit boundary crossed.
LOW
ALARM
NORM:~L
NORMAL~------------------------------~--------
123
15:23:29 *5
15:31:23 "6
15:31:25 *6
15:31:31 *5
456
MERSEY 1/275B KV 280 278
AVON STANG1_GROUP1
UMFOLOZI NORRX1_GROUP1
MERSEY CORPR1 MVA 71
Table 1 Typical format of alarm messages
1.4 SCADAand MMI Design
A quiescent system is one in which the alarm rate, is roughly, less than 10 alarm
messages per minute. These alarm messages, each of which has to be read,
understood. acknowletlged and then deleted, are routinely hardled by the contret staff •
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little or i\o effective pro.vision is made for dealing with excessive alarm data, nor with its
presentation Q,uringa-pnwer system disturbance. It i.> during disturbances that the control
staff suffer from data overloading in its extreme form,
1.5 Data Overloadil'l.g Definition
pata overloadihg is a situation that occurs when the number of alarm messages arriving
at operator ~or\~sf~(;ons exceeds the ability of the control staff to use, process or react to
t') .i '--. \them·, \,.... 10. . rl
During a distu~ance" the control stafftend to ignore most of the atarm messages, since
99% of these m;~ssages represent the effect of a primary cause and not a definition of
the problem. Apipendix 1coot" .is a sample listing from a disturbance on the ESKOM
network, By ob~iervation it can be seen that the primary event was a fault at the Tutuka
po~{er station at 15h23:21, the causewas unknown. The effecfs ofthe fault are the
subsequent 43(1 odd alarms as seen by the control staff, who have to determine the
cause of the problem frem the multiplicity of the effects.
Associated with the sudden surge of alarm data, is a corresponding demand for
explanations as to what has gone wrong, both from staff and management. To ada to the
confusion, some messages f1asn and have audible tones associated with them.
B~twe.en 25 to sa alarm messages tan be viewed at any Me time, usually
bhronologically with the newest message at the top. Control staff page or scroll through
the listing using a mouse or key sirokes to review the messages, When a new message
is added to the top. of the list, the display is re-autput starting at the top. This makes it
almost impossible to read each message or do anything until the messages Mtllslly stop
arriving. An altemative is to pause the screen output or generate a hard copy of the
messages in the window. During a distuli)ance this can be difficult to do Of dangerous as
the control staff need to see what else is' going wrong.
The structure and format of the messages are designed for a quiescent power system
state and not for a disturbance conditions. This can be seen by examining Appendix 1,
each of the messages refers to a single fact or state change. Many messages refer to
similar things at the same substation at the same time, such as the frequency indications
from Lethabo power station. No pruvision is made to compensate for conditions that are
already known by the control staff, nor things that will always take place under given
conditions such as the voltage of a unit dropping to zero if the generator breaker is
opened. In gener~1 the design ofthe alarm messages, their structure and content is
based on each device reporting its own state changes with no regard to what is
happening around it. There is no method yet, of combining messages at the source to
reduce the number of messages sent to the control staff. The post disturbance evaluation
techniques are manual, laborious and it is very difficult to determine what actually
happened without accurate time stamped data.
All messages have to be acknowledged individually or by page before they can be
deleted. Audible alarms have to. be acknowledged each time they are triggered. Added to
thts, is the pressure to perform and make the correct decision as fast as possible so as to
arrest further degradation of the electrical network.
Currently. the only concession made for disturbance conditions is the size of alarm
message buffers. These butters are usually big enough to handle the maximum number
of potential alarm messages expected during a disturbance perle-
1.6 Control Staff Disturbance Activity.
Initial activity focuses on establishing the extent ot the disturbance and the potential
kntick~on effects. Control staff manitoj' the system disturLance behaviour initially from
atarrmmessaqes and secondly by watChing the system frequency meter, which
grtfp~lically and digitally indicates that the system is suffering from a disturbance.
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Once control staff have a mental picture of the power system following a disturbance, the
generation 0f additional alarm messages is highly anno~ing. Control stati.kno\\ltf)ey have
a problem and the repeHtlon otexisting rnessaqes is unnecessary.
Control 5taft have two major issues to deal with during a disturbance:
a) Qnders'lsnding the nature oUhe (iisturbance and its. potential consequences
b) Correcting the problem as fast as possible.
Their priorities are:
G Find out how secure the remainder of the network. is and carry out any necessary
switching.
o Determine the generation neected to restore the frequency to its normal state.
• Find out how it will takelt> repair the fault and restore the supply to normal,
• Request the powers stations to increase or decrease generation if necessary.
• Request regions. to shed load if necessary.
In effect the job of the control staff resembles the assernbly of a jigsaw puzzle from an
overabundance of pieces, nClt aUof which are relevant to the puzzte·at hand, but include
some pieces that belong to lid.ilfterent pUZ7.lethat must be assembled and understood
simultaneously.
The speed with I,Afhichthe puz,a:11ftis put together determines the speed Of solution. In this
analogy the Jigsaw pieces have to be e;;traCl.ed from the alarm message texts and the
displays."
in the proqess of solving the pro(llem, large quantities Of alarm text and dispfay c.!2ta hav~
to be processed and discarded in order to understand the basic problem and theh correct
the fault. During serious disturbar'lces, additional help is often required from field staff to
obtain confirmation Of the 8}"l;lImptions made from the reporteci effects.
It should be remembered thai: the format and struc;ture of an alarm m'~age is based on
a quiescent power system state p;j)t a distulbed o~!~, and as such only Simple. state
change messages are ever allowed for. There has been no acknowledgement of the
need, for tM control staff to have a different alarm message forma1 Oi"structure, to cater
for a (Jisturoed power system state.
1.7 Importance Of The Research
The consequence of a disturbance is usually the loss of supply to consumers. by
reducing the time required to restore supply, the utility "educes the loss of income,
prestige and decreases the irritation to its customers.
By providing the control staff with the ability to rapidly obtain a clear picture of the fault
and its effects, the power system can be restored sooner. The savings to me utility are
extremely valuable and can be measured in millions of Rand.
On page 18 of the Oec. 1994 EPRI journal {18} the comment is made" ,•.researchers at
the University of Washington concluded that the problem in power system applications is
no longer computation time - it is comprehension time."
1.8 Solution Options
A pre-requisite for the solution to the problem of control staff data overloading, is the
realisation that the existing data presentation and delivery philosophy are no longer
adequate for the control of large electric power systems. This is particularly relevant in
the light of the additional data demands on the SCADA system, from both inside and
outside the control room.
There appear to b~ two possible solution options:
• The use of expert systems to process alarm messages!sent to the control staff and to
produce diagnostic messages to explain the network behaviour.
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.. The Introduction ·of a new Man Machine Interface and data acquisition philosophy
making use of FuJIgraphic workstations.
The use Of Expert systems has be.M tried on a number of occasions but does not seem
to be widely aocepted or implemented, [see g, 1.0, 12, 151. Expert systems running in
parallel to the exi$ting alarm system. provide control staff with a list of potential
explanations or pos~\ible diagnostics of the prob!~m. but not the .exao~caus& The control'
stfilfl'~W,have to wade through the incoming mass of messaces in ol'detl to validate the
ES output [9]. Expert systems are also very expensive to build and mai~~ain particularly
for a dynamic system such as. an e='~ctricalUtility. '
Fundamentally the solution to the data overload problertllies in understanding Md
changing the way alarm information is acquired, delivered and presented to the oontrol
staff. It is important to recognise tile needs of tM. control staff under different operating
conditions and to support their requirements by uSing a full graphics man machine' '.
interface to the fullest extent before expert systems are installed.
I2xpert systems have a large part, to piily in the monitOring and control Of power systems,
.but their integration haG to be reconsidered in terms of available input data, computer
power and communications f~c?ities, as well as the value of pote,Q:tim~~;t,*g~that can be
provided. ' ,\ ' .
1.9 Solution Objective
The objective of the solution proposed in this report, is to reduce the time it takes the
control staff to understand a problem on the power system and increase speed of fault
oorrection without farcing the control staff to process unnecessary aM unwanted data, or
delaying the deliv~ry of oruoial data.
1.10 Pictorial map of the project report
Figure 1-1 illustrates the different stages inVOlved in the development of the (lew alarm
plJiJosophy to improve \lisualisation of the power system state by control staff where each
block represents one or more sections in the project report.
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Figure 1-1 Pictorial map of the project report
4
1.11, Overview of the project report
chapter '1 is an introductian to the problem of data overloadhlg.
Chapter 2 discusS:es the bacKground and reviews all the factors affecting the data
overloading problem.
Chapter 3 covers the task analysis and control staff requirements used to design the new
MMI.
Chapter 4 is an analy~j!.? of the associated literature relating to data overloading and (I
existing solutions. I, f "
Chapter S analyses the existing data processing philosophy and control room activity, in
order to identity the problems and needs of ESKOM's National Control staff.
Chapter 6 proposes a possibl~ solution to the data overload problem and defin,es the
basic requirements needed to Implement .it. The three areas are a) Host data base
structure, b) Ma~Machine Interface and c) Remote Terminal changes.
Chapter 7 explains how the chal'iges defined in chapter 6 can be implemented in the Man
Machine Interface and Mw the control staff use the new MMi faoilities.
Chapter 8 discusses how the "secretary mode" 'functions referred to in chapter 6 are used
to control displayed data and the how the ERTU supplements conventional telemetered
data.
Chapter 9 examines the ongoing changes taking place in SCADA systems and the
consequences jf nothing is done to change the existing methods of displaying large
qUantities ottelemetered data.
Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter and ei,aluates the proposed solution in terms of the
initial problem definition. The costs of impleirnenting the proposed ~olution are examined
along with an implementation plan. This enapter also includes a critical review of the
project report.
There are seven appendices:
1 Examples of an ESKOM disturbance IOSI. "
2 A copy of the 1994 ESKOM TelecontrQI Standard U~ed to wire up Remote Terminal
Units.
3 Task analysis of ESKOM's National Control staff.
4 Man Machine Interface functionality comments and requirements,
5 Phase 3 protection element data for a StatiC Voltage Compensator
6 Glossary.
7 References.
1.12 Summary
This chapter defined data over loading and reviewed the actions of control staff during a
disturbance in the ppwer system, Of the Mo possible options examined, the Expert
System one was rejected since it was unable to solve the basic problem of data
overloading. Lastly there is a pictorial map of project report.
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z, BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
This section discusses the relevant staqes that make up the path taken by the raw data
as it travels from the plant in a substation to its final output on the displays in the 'Control
room.
Figure 1-1 shows the major stages making up the data path from the monitored plant to
the control room, the substation RTU sends the data via microwave radio to the control
centre where the front end hardware combines all tM radio signals stores them in tl1'3:
host data base ..The MMI software uses .tne plant data to updat~ the displays used by the
control staff at the workstations to monltortne plant state, within two seconds of the
elements being scanned by the RTU.
Substation Remote Terminal
unit (RTU)
Microwave link
to Control C()ntre
Host computer and
data base
Control staff work station
and CRT monitor with one-line
display of the substation
elmtral Centre
."
Front End
Figurfl 2-1 Pictorial view of the data path from the RTU to the control room
2.2 Telemetel'ed Data
The transfer of information between the RTU and the control staff involves a number of
transtormatlons.
Initially the data is no more than signals in the substation. In the process of telemetering
or moving data to the control centre and ultimately presenting it to the control staff, the
following changes take place:
1. Basic Signals are supplied to the RTU from the substation switching yard.
2. These signals in the RTU are telemetered to the Control Centre were they are stored
in the Host data base.
3. The Host converts the data into information by adding text and presenting the
information to the control staff either as an alarm message or as changes on the
displays.
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4. As the ct~!'Itrol staff interpret the messages 01' the changes on the displays the
inforrnatidt,.b€lcQmes knowledge of the current power system state.
It is this knowled'tle that is used to understand the behaviour of the power system and to
oontrcl it. Uoaerst::mding the exact nature ofttle different stages in the datapath and
matching the mentatimages the control staff have ofthe power system,. with the plant
data, win reduce the tI~~eneeded to make decisions as to how to correct problems in the
power system.
2.3 Plant structure
In general terms, the eler,nocnl equipment at a substation is referred to by different names
clepending upon the leve[pf detail under discussion. These different levels as lndloated in
Figure 2-2 have definite divisions, and fit neatly into a pyrami~1 structure as. follows:
Figure 2-2 Electrical network structure
• At the lowest level are the individual data
eit)ments such as single or double bit status
points, analogs, controllable polnts, tap
positions, etc.
• When the elements are grl1uped together
they form devices such as breakers and
links.
• When the devices are grouped together they
form electrica' objects such as feeders,
bus bars, reactors, capacitors and
transformers, etc,
• Grouping objects together creates the
substation Of power station .
., Grouping the substations together forms the
electrical network.
2.4 Mental Models
DiSCussions with the control and the .distribution staff involved with the physical plant at
the S!lbstations and power stations nevealed that ahey support and use the pyramid
structure shown in Figure 2·2. They confirm that it is a correct interpretation of the
concept model used in discussions 0,( power system problems among themselves.
Observing the working behaviour at 'the control staff, they constantly traverse the different
levels of the pyramid. The structure of the alarm messages match the lower four levels of
the pyramid. However the electrical object name is 'not implicitly defined I')ufcan be
determined from the device name. For example, in the alarm message below, the station
is HYDRA, the electrical object is TR_2 or transformer 2, the device is tile 400KV MAL_2
or the number 2 motor operated link on the 400kV busbar and the element state indicates
that it is now closed.
eS:24:31 HYDRA TR_2_ 400_MAL2 CLOSE
Once the device and element details are sorted out, in this case the link has been closed,
the focus then moves upwards again to Object I(::\(el,Le. the transtormer, where the next
decision ,s made. This can be verified by listing to the communications between the
dis~ribution field staff and the control staff. The focus of attention is initially directed to a
given problem area by referring to the net1.VOrkand station, followed by the electrical
object under review followed by the device and elements with the problem.
It should be remembered that only the element data at the lowest level otthe pyramid is
physically connected or wired into tM Remote Terminal Units,
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The rest of the data in the other levels in Figure 2..2. is purely abstract and is assembled
manually, based. on the element states from the element level.
2.5 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
The R"f'U has two primary funcnons:
t, Receives scan requests and supervisory commands from the host
2. Transmits thG requested scanned element data back to the host
Normally, each element in the station has its own unique location in the RTU. However,
due to hardware and communication resmoticns, not all the element states can be
connected individually to the RTU. The restrictions force a large number of elements to
be gathered into separate groups. If one element in a group is abnormal, then the whole
group is considered to be abnormal. Control staff have to call out distribution staff to visit
'ihe site and determine which one of the elements caused the group to be abnormal which
increases the time it takes before the problem can be solved.
The first generation of RTUs installed at the substations and power stations were used
purely to forward the plant data values to the host computer system. These older RTUs
are oof)sidered primitive in comparison with ihe current generation. New RTUs are being
delivered with enhanced facilities and are called Enhanced RTUs, or simply'ERTUs.
2.6 Enhanced Remot~ Terminal Unit
In practloe the ERTU is a centralised, stand alone data capture unit that can act
independently of any host computer system. 11ha5 its own onooard computer and data
base which allows it to act as host device to a number of smaller' RTI ' i.1 or bay processors
which are In tum connected directly to the plant.
Bay
r:ro::e:;scr
Bedrica ~octs hava
their 0M1Bay JlOOOSSOI'
Figure 2-3 Substation and ERTU interlacing structure
An ERTU is designed not only to act as the interface between the control staff and the
plant but also to provide general 'Ilteliaclng facilities to the plant as a whole and the
substation control room. as indicated in Figure 2-3. The need to have multiple host users
connecting their"own wiring to the plant is replaced by a single 110 polnt to the entire
substation via the ERTU,
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The users of the ERrU are:
• tocal $l.Ibstation control room MMI computer
• Local b~y RTUs or PLCs controlling a single feeder or lransform~r panel
II Additional host SCAOA systerns supporting regional control centres
I) National contror SCADA $ysterri
o Local maintenance aotivitv to the bay processors or ERTU data base and software
facilities. '.. ... .»:
The desigrt of the new ERTUs provides major advantages over the olde~.CONITEL.
RTLJ$, e.g.
• Ability to access a far larger number of element data points at the substation.
• Provide millisecond resolution sequence of event logging on all status pOints.
" Perform software functions on multiple inputs.
• Communicate with multiple hosts and slave RTUs.
• Pt{)VidS pr~-pr(;lcesSltlg of data prior 1(;1 sending the results to the host.
e Removal of grouped data points.
Since the ERTU facilities cemnot ,be supported by the existing CONITEL pi6toC61 used fjy
the older RTUs, a ne'N protocol called ESTEL has been developed to support the ERTU
functions. .
2.7 ESTELProtocol
Sinqe 1988, ESKOM has be~lldeveloping its own standard communications protocol
oal®d ESTEL [19]. This pr( 1 is based on the Open Systems lnterconnect Referel,vv
Moqel (OSI~~M). ESKOM \. ._.Jloped ESTEL to' avoid being locked into proprietary
:vendor communication hardware and software.
ESTEL is designed to solve many of the problems encountered with the various vendor-
specific communlcanons ptotocolS. ESTEL was also d.9veloped to meet ESKOM's future
protocol j"ieeds for the IW.Q.eVariE!ty (If dHta d~mai'td~t:t by ttte vsn(lUs hMt (lompUfetS ami
to be compatible with international telecommunication standards.
2.8 Host Computer System
The existit1{) computer systl:in Iconsists of up..to-date modem VAX llatdwate C(jf1f1~~,~tl
via DECnet using two Ethernet b.:lckbones as indicated in Figure 2-4.
Front Ends
MMI Eth&rhet
Figure 2-4 Host hardware configuration
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Two separate Etht!tfl!'R Cltcutts are ossd to reduce Ute risk l.:lf sll1(:jIE!~fjQII:tt-failute.AS
indicated, each Ethernet backbone is used for different purposes,
The primary e.'lataacquisition softWare modules, i.e. SCADA, Alarm and the Man Machine
Intlenaee software are all relatively Old and are based on a 1986 release of the original
vendors product. They have since been modified to communicate with the ERTUs using
tbe eSTEL protocol, The SCADA system was initially clIstomised tf,) communicate with
the existing Leeds and Northrop RTUs using CONITEL protocol developed by t.&N and
IJOm~j~SiOOed for ESKOM in 1976.
2.9 Data Base
As indicated in Figure 2~4, the host computers receive the telemetered data from the
RTUs and store it in Internal data bases. The data is then extracted by the MMI software
when required. and displayed graphically on workstation video display units for use by the
control staff. .
;,:
il
The existing host data base structures are well de\:fe1oped and have reliable support
software to meet the needs of the older RTUs. Wit~ the installation of the ERTUs and the
ESTEL protocol, far more data elements can be accessed and telernetered to the host
data base. Grouped element points can now be unqrouped and alarmed individually.
The ungrouping of the approximately 20 different sets of group elements, has prompted
the SCADA stante list all the expanded data elements required from each electrical
device in a document called the Telecontrol standard.
2.10 Telecontrol Standard
The wiring standard lists all the input status and measurement elements requlred from
each device scanned by ail\',E:RTUAppendix 2: !s a copy of the Telecontrol Standard.
ESKOM Is pianriirtg II:! insiau ERTUS at allff!> Interconnected substations during the next
five years.
Implementing the new Telecontrol Standard at aU sUDs{atiinlS will cause tile total nurrioer
of elements processed by the SCADA syst~m to increase by a daunting 250%. the
details of this growth are covered in Chapter 9.
\
}~Sthere has not been any changes in the host data proceS,s)ng philosopny, these
a~~itional data points will be treated in the same manner as the current methods of data
stc:rage and display. The MMI and host data base are not currently able to use the
add~ional facilities offered by the ERTUs and no consideration has yet been given as to
how the control staff or the MMI will handle the additional data and display load.
2.11 Man Mal,;hine hlterface
The e>l:1stingMan Machine Interface uses DEC Workstations to run a software emulation
of the I~ONLOG character graphics hardware. The original CONLOG display units .
allowetl one display per screen, with multiple screens combined to form an operating
consoh~.The DEC Workstations have been configured to have four different display
window~ ViSihlEf':un one'screert at the same time.
\
Each d~.lplay window uses eight colours, 64 pre-defined graphic symbols and 64
QWERTV characters defined for CONLOG displays, Each display window is a fixed 80 x
64 charscter area. Thef!~ are usually tWll worKstl:ltlM screens per C!Oflsole as ii'1di~ate(j in
figure 2·.~\
Each (,'Qns$l~Mas a fttbUSe and dedi/j~U~a l<.eybo~utl to Interaot with the display hardware
and call up displays in anyone of the of the windows •
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DIsplay l'e~p6lise,tjme is u~ually witl'ihi 2 seoonQsexcept irl tile case M alarm Qat~ivJ@icl:\
can taktr tiP, to 20 seconds from the time of request to display qepending upon the up the
numbar (If ~IEii'ms il1 tHe tluff~r O£ldthe 110 load 011 ttn~CPU.
Figure 2-5 MMI hardware configuration
A new t:lIli graphics display facility is ~vailab!ethat can run side by side'with charaCter
graphics th,e' on the same Workstations, but as the full graphics softWare. is still in the
development stage, there are a large number of desired. functions not yet available which
prevent its on-line implementation.
Based on the needs of the control staff during a disturbance and the-ease Of use of the
6liilra61er grapnics, mere are serious reservations as to tM ability of itia Full gl'a~liiM
paokage (in its current form), to prOVide additional value over and above the character
gl'apliios paCkage.
As me Full grdptlics package is C!esigriedto wortu:iire.Ctly witli tile f\6st daia oase and not
with the ERTUs there has to be a serious evaluation of its ability to replace the Character
graphics package.
2.12 Summal),
ihis chapter reviewed the physical components of the- SCAOA system, the networK
structure and the mental models used by the control staff to monitor the power system.'
oetans Ofll'le "aW RTUs and -ina commufll<mt!Of1 rm.:U()C(:IIWare msCUssea al(mg WithtM
Telecontrobstandard and the physical design ofthe MMI.
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a,MN'iI RESEARCH REVIEW
3.1 Overview
This Chapter reviews an investigation undertaken to determine the practic~l Man Machine
Interface problems experienced by control staff while carrying out their daily tasks. The
objective of the investigation was to establish a composite MMl.view of the ooolroi room
environment in terms of the tasks carried out by the control statt as a whole and then to
examine the external ractors influencing the behaViour ofthe control staff.
The research covers the (ollowing aspects:
1. Control room task analySiS
2. Cuntrol staff interviews
3. B~gional Control requirements
4. Natiyt;lal Control manager's nee.~s
5. seN JA vendors comments .
6. ~e"" .ete Terminal Unit changes
7. Data communication changes
8. Teleoontrol standard
Each of the 8 items investigated are listed under headings 3.1.1 to 3.1.8 below,
3.1.1 Control Room Task Analysis
TM investigation started off with a task analysis of each of the four working positions ill
the.~ontrol room, l.e. :
1. Shift Supervisor (.)ifl-lread ofSl1iff
2. Generation control <:
3. Network voltage conttQI
.4. Transmission or network st<;!pility control
r~'('
Figure 3·4 shQWSthe ah'angement ot the desks in the control room. staff are seated in
an..arc facing the dynamic mapboard or mimic. There are 5 shifts working in rotation;
between,8 and 12 hours a day depending upon the day in the week.
Voltage
~
Dynamic Mapboard
Generation Transmission
Shift
supervlsor
Figure 3~1 Arrangement of consoles in National Contra'
The task analySis was aimed at determining the basic problems experienced by the
members of National Control while engaged in carrying out their daily tasks using the
existing Character Graphic MMI facilities.
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The details of the task analysis are documented in Appendix 3. The results of the
analysis ~ere used to guide the interviews described in section 3.1.2.
3.1.2 Control Staff Requirements
Each of the ~hifts at National Control Were interviewed with discussions based on the
task an&.Ysis described io Appendix 3. Each of their MMI actions was listed. discussed
and analysed with respect to the eXisting Man M~chine Interface both for quiescent
behaviour and disturbance conditions. The questions used for the discussions are lister.
in Table 2.
Are there a large number of incorrect values on th...:..e_d__;i~sp,:..:I.;.:.:aYl-__ .. .,. ..... ...,l
Table.2 MMIQuestion topiCS
The responses to the questions are discussed and tabulated in Appendix 4.
The results of the interviews provided overall comments and highlighted many problems
experienced by the national control staff land provideo the opportunity to test a number of
a!temative methods and philosophies for the presentation of SCADA data using Full
graphic workstations, especially during disturbances.
What 3r~ the major frustrations with the MMI in general
WhatM<.,"~(mal data Is needed on the display
NavigafiOil-problems experienced~-~~~~--~~-.-~--~~~--------~Is mapboard information sufficient or is additional data needed
Methods of calling up displays and associated probleZ'1rI ,.~.-~----.--,.,-j
Primary displays used most often and why
Most difficult task to carry (Jut due to data availability and MMI problems
Examples of well designed MMI
Function~lityneeded to make the MMI easier to use
Problems assOciated With alarm processing in general
Quiescent alarm process;ing problems"
r-Oisturbed state alarm processing problems
Symbolised alarm data compared to the text form
Advanced data processing. needs at the RTU and the workstation
Potential of 3D gra'Phj~ as a u.s~fll! tool
Problems involving operatingerr6rs>';'.-a~n-:d-:'id-:-e-a-s~t-o-re-d-:-u-c-e~t:-he-m---~----.-
Use of vector or Kiviat diagrams [6]
'use of Venn diagrams to indicate protection information
Need for additional protection data and display methods
Use of Sequence of event data
Need for hypermedia and hypertext facilities
GI'oupeci alarm data details on demand
To what extent are faise alarms a problem
3.1.3 Regional Control Consideration
The data overload problem was discussed with the control staff from tile five regional
control centres in ESKOM during aseries of meeting to establish a standard MMI
philosophy for building displays using full graphic software. The regional control staff
confirmed ~.heneed for a method of reducing data ovenoad conditions experienced by the
distribution and reticulation control centres. They emphasised that they required a few
additional facilities over and above the basic design specified in chapters 6,1& 8. In
general they supported the proposed ohilosophy and wanted to be involved in its
development
3.1.4 National Control Manager
The National Control manager was interviewed in order to determine his needs, both for
current and future changes in the power system. The discussions revealed problem
areas and possible solution directions. He highlighted the fact that ESKOM is expanding
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both locally and internationally. The expansion activities are gOing ttl add an additional
wQrk,load to the National Control Staffin the near future. tie supported the need to
examine alternative methOds to display disturbarure data to the control staff.
3.1.5 SCADA Vendor ComHlents
Discussions were also held with the staff oft:uropean an~ American vendors
(Westinghouse and Siemens) who are delivering Energy Management Systems in South
Africa and to a m~mber of overseas countries.
The olJjective Was to establish whether there have been any Change on either the
Vendors' side or by their development staff with respect to new ideas for alarm
processing and data visualisation philosophy. Both vendor representatives indicated that
they had 'not really thought about the problem and did not have short term plans to
change their existing display and data delivery facilities.
3.1.6 Enhanced Remote Terminal Units
The ERTU hardware structure and sottware facilities were investigated to see what
functionality was available and to \7RSUrethat the needs of the control staff could bc:..net.
Interviews were conducted with ESKOM design teams that s~cified the ERTU
functionality (19}. They indicated: that the initial deSign of the ERrU was, based on the
premise that local RTU proces.:;ing could and would be supported, however, at the time,
they did not know what shape it would take. The design team completely supported the
"secretary mqde" functions suggested in Chapters 7 & 8.
3.1.7 ESTEL Protocol
The philosophy and' behaviour of tM ne$p(otocol were io~~~~ated to sea what facilities
were available and what the restrictions were. [201.·The protfii:;Jt~esign J#+ams
recognised that some ..Changes would be needed to implement the n~wPhjIO~l~phYand
supported th.e ideas in chapters 6, 7 & 8 in principle.
$.1.8 Telecontrol Standard
The element data requirements specified for each device in the standard were studied to
determine rf there were any logical groupings that the elements could be divided into.
Discussions were held with the individual shift managers to obtain ttl~ir feelings and
needs in respect of'the data ill the new standard in terms of quiescent End disturbed
net-Nark conditions.
Section 7 of the standard (see AppendiX 2) is structured by equipment type, te ..
1. Generators
2. Feeders
3. Bus coupler and section I transformer breakers
4. Transformers
5. Shunt Reactors
6. Shunt Capacitors
7, Series Capacitors
8, stanc Voltage Compensators
9. Station Level
i0.Physical Security
11. Integrated Values
From an examination of the element data per device and discussions with the shift
managers and the National Control Manager, the element data for saoh device, can be
divided iota three broad categories called Health, Protection and Information.
For example, the elements belonging to Transformer Breakers (see pages 9,and 10 of
Appendix 2) have be divided into the three categories as shown in Table 3.
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M2 protection trip
Health (.\ Protection Information
Air pressti~t,i-..?I..,..,u:-"rg~e...;.;n...;.;t~-:-I--:P=-ole Discrepancy Breaker state (open/closed)
Air Pressure~Non urgent BlIs zone Breaker Charged
Main 1 DC fail Bus strip Breaker control - local/remote
Main 2 DC fail Mt protection trip SupeNisory Control- On/Off
Control DC fail M1 HV instantaneous over current Malf' 1 protection on/off
!--::C-:-lo"';';s-e-::D::-:C::--7'fa"::iI-~""""--I-M:-:·:-:-1-:H·.:;v"7.' ""b ac-:k-u-p-o-v-e-rc-u-rr-e=n~t=========:2M~=a~jn~2:.!..pro:_~t_e_ct_i_or_'_o_n/_o...;.;ff~....,
Spring rewind fail M1 HV earth fault operated
Isolator DC fail M1 MV instantaneous over current
AC/DC Converter fail M1 MV.backup over CUITent
M1 MV Earth fault operated
M1 Tertiary instantaneous over.currentr---------------~-I-~~--:
M1 Tertiary IOMT over current
M2 HV instantaneous over current
M2 HV backup over current
M2 HV Earth fault operated
M2MV instantaneous over current
M2 MV backup over current
M2 MV Earth fault operated
M2 Tertiary instantaneous over current
M2 Tertiary IOMT over current
Table:3 1t~m.former breaker elements divid~d by category i'
1 .,.'< "
After further discussions With-the National Control manager and protecti\'''' ' ~<,ft • ,""as
decided to subdivide the protection category into two groups, Main 1 or (hu~I"~(j{edtion
and Main 2 or Backup protection.
There is a significant difference between the .two protection categories. Gen~rally, Main 1
protects the device from local faults, where as Main 2, (or backup) provides protection
from remote faults. During a disturbance the ability to differentiate between the two
categories at a glance will allow control sta.ff to quickly identify equipment that has faulted
to protect itself and that which has operated to stop a cascaded fault.
Separating the two categories can significantly reduce the time it takes to restore supply
to consumers and assist comror staff to understand the nature and source of the fault.
The subdivision of the protection element data also makes it possible to provide
additional graphical feedback of thE!system state in terms of actual device protection
activity and assist with dynamic fault~iagnosis. Figure 7A has examples of how the
protection element data can be used t&display graphically the zones in which protection
equipment has operated. ..
3.2 Summary
This chapter established the·MMI view of the control room environment in terms of the
tasks carrieo. out by the contror staff. The topic.."icovered were :
1. Controt rcom task analysis
2. Control staff interviews
3. Regional Control requirements
4. National Control manager's needs
5. SCADAvendors comments
6. Remote Term'lOal Unit changes
7. Data communication changes
8. Telecontrol standard.
9.
The chapter also lists the needs and opinions of ClU interest groups and factors external to
the control centre influencing the new MMI design.
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4.· THE PROBLEM OF DATA OVERLOADING
4.1 ~ntroduction
This chapt~r reviews control.:,room aCiflVityand analyses the ,~Xistingdata procAssifitt
philosophy Which causes data overloading in power systeny/CQhtroi rooms. -
4.2 Daily Tasks
The. minute by minute management Qf a power utility is concerned with:
• Keeping the voltage and frequency within limits
$ Ensuring that power is delivered to the consumer
" Preventing the overloading of lines and transformer)
• Adapting to seasonal and climatic changes in consumer demand'
41 Planned outages of generating plant and power lines
• M!"~aging the system in the most economic manner available
• filoblems caused by thunder storms, wind, lightning, floods, fog, etc.
• Equipment failure causing generator or litle trips
., ..' Operating errors
iii Primary protection equipment failure and consequent secondary protection operation
& Grass or forest fires causing line trips
.. Pollution deposits on the insulators causing Iin'7 trips
lt False alarms from the RTU
• Network changes in the form of new equipment and new transmisslon lines
• Inter~utility power transactions
From the above list, it is obvious that the work of the control staff is \tariM and requires a
great deal of background knowledge and skill to meet contin4~U$ly all the. consumers'
expectations. A large number and many different typ~p-of-r:.l!:~b[~mshave to be solved on
a daily basis.
\-.
The primary source of information on the state of the power ~~~ork is the output from
computer system. The output ofthe existing system is in the form of alarm messages
and changes to the one-line displays. Since the computer system does not provide the
control staff with all the required infQr.nation, the control staff have to work closely with
the distributip'll and power station S\I·' 11order to keep the power system operating
efficiently. The trensmlssion and distrlQlItion staff have to be available to travel to the
substations to provide the control staff with additional information as and when required.
substatlons are not permanently manned and it can take staff many hours to reach a
substation. It is this reason which has prompted the existing alarm philoso, ',W,
4.3 Alarm Philosophy
The philosophy behind the generation of alarm messages in ESKOM, and in virtually
every other electric utility, is based on the assumption of a quiescent network state. r:;is
meac ...~hat whenever any measured value crosses a limit boundary or any single
element changes state without authority. an alarm message is produced. The alarm
message is used to alert the control staff to respond to the event and taKe corrective
action where needed.
There is a problem with this approach, because each device in a substation is
independent of all other devices and responsible for its own protection. As a result, each
device will produce an alarm message of a fault, detected by its sensing equipment. at
the same time as the same fault is detected and reported by all other devices. This is the
origi;t of the data overload problem.
To make matters worse, the designers of power system control rooms tend to follow the
rule. "Give the control staff all the data you can and they will make the correct declslon
more easily and faster!" [13], The underlying assumption is that the additiQnal data will
provide proof of the problem and help prevent further problems. The effect Of thiS
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approach is to exacerbate an already difficult snuatiQO which aggravate~ the data
overload problem. Progress ,messages are a case In point.
4.4 Progress Messages
The SCAOAsystem is r:lf'-signed not generate alarms when eQ,uipment reac~'es the final
state following a commal1de!1 state change. However if a device; such as a hydro
generator, is requestectto <Jhange state; the intermediate state changes are alarmed
since they are not the final state I but change state as part of the progress of the device
from one state to another. There is no way currently to suppress these messages without
adding code at the RTU or at the ho~Ho suppress the messages under specific
conditions.
Table 4 lists 11 messages from a single hydro generating unit as it moves from one state
to another. These messages are generated each time any of 12 hydro units change
state.
The messages indicate the various pre-programmed stages that the hydro unit takes as it
moves from a generating mode to standstill. In the messages. G/M refers to
generator/motor, The stages are;
1. Automatic power factor regulation is switched on
2. The current GEN. state is no longer true
3. The unit is not able to move directly to pumping
4. KV unit breaker is open (tripped)
5. Unit output voltage drops to 1 KV ( It must as the unit has stopped generating and is
not connected to the network)
6. The exciter voltage becomes O.
7. Unit exciter voltage becomes hi~lh (note the time)
8. Unit exciter voltage goes to 0 volts 10 seconds later;
9. Automatic power factor regulation. is SWitched off \
10. Unit shutdown state is reached after 4 minutes
11. Minutes tater ihe pony motor breaker closes to allow the unit to start up again if
required
1) 09:20:17 *6 PRAKN G/M_ARPR..,4 ON_OFF ON
2) 09:20:17 *6DRAKN G/M_GEN_4 YES_NO NO
3) 09:20:17 *60RAKN PMP_START_NOT_REAP_4YE~_NO NO
4} 09:22;20 *4 ORAKN G/M4_400_BKR TRIP
5) 09:22:26 *5 ORAKN G/M_4 KV 9 1 LOW
6) 09:22:26 *5 PRAKN EXCITER_VOLTS_4 VOLT 0 ~58 LOW
7) 09:2?:26 *5 PRAKN PK_EXC_PLT_VOLTS_4 VOLT 1 HIGH
8) 09:22:36 *5 PRAKN DK_EXC_OLT_VOLTS_4 VOLT 0 0 LOW
9) 09:22:38 *6 PRAKN G/M_ARPR_4 ON_OFF OFF
10) 09:24:38 *6 DRAKN G/M_SHUTPOWN_4 YES_NO YES
11) 09:26:04 'k4 PRAKN GIM 4PM_BKR CLOSEL-.=-....._~ --==----==;.__ ~ ....... .--.- ''',~-_''''f.'''''''''''_
Table 4 Hydro unit state challge messages
The messages are generated on the assumption that the control staff can spot a potential
problem with the unit in question, and react to it by noticing when a specific message
does NOT appear. these messages do not appear nec.;tly as a group but are
interspersed with other messages.
if there is a problem in the network these same 11 messages (and more. depending on
the number of units in use) get in the way of more Important messages. The control staff
do not need these hydro Imlt data messages, wh10h are not related to a disturbance and
they become extremely annoyed, since these messages do not assist them at all. As a
result they are ignored and deleted out of hand,
Puring a disturbance these messages just clutter the alarm page and in the process of
being deleted, useful valid messages can also be mistakenly deleted,
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4.5 The Fire Hose Syndrome
Currently, working ilt'J contrcl roornls eq'JivalenHo tying the control room operator to a
garden ohair and djrecting 'a jet of water at him~~wjth.1hejet of wat~r representing tpe rate
Of alarm data. See Figure 4-1, Thtquantity and freqJJencyof the alarm data changes
with the state of the power system and matches ttle qua~jt~' and pressure of the watE;lr,
frool the hose pipe. When a disturbance occurs the nose pipe is replaced by a fire hose.
(The quantity and type of alarms being reported inorea~es significantly.) Remember, the
control room operat",,, Is unable to get out <Jf the garden ohair or avoid the water.
DisturbedQUiesecent
Figure 4~1 The fire hose analogy
DlJring a disturbance the control staff have two basic problems;
1.· They can never stop alarm messages being generated.
2. AUalarms have to be aoknowledqed before they can be deleted otherwise the alarm
buffers ovelf)ow causing messages, some new and necessary, to be lost and potential
computer system problems.
This situation is exacerbated when the control staff know what caused the condition, but
they are unable to tell the computerthey know. This is demonstrated in Appendix 1,
which lists part of the first 3 minutes of alarm messages from a minor disturbance in the
ESKOM in~eroonnected network during April 1994.
The disturbance was eaused by the opening of an energised busbar isolator (JirIk)in
error. The protection schemes at Tutuka power station deteoted this as ,afault on the
busbars amftrippeg all 5 generator breakers with consequentlal 105$ of 1750 Megawatt.s
of generation. This minor event generated 433 alarms in 10 minutes, with 79 in the first
30 seconds as indicated in Figure 4-2.
~-:
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4.5 The Fire Hose Syndrome,
"
currently. working in a control room is equivalent to tying the control room operator to a
o~rden chair 1,inddirecting a jet of water at him, with the jet of water representing the rate
cit'alarm data. See Figure 4·1. The quantity and frequency ofthe alarm da~a change~
with the state ~tJh~power system and matches the quantity and pressure of the water
from the hose,:pipe, When a disturbance oC9urs the hose pipe is replaced by a fire hose.
(The quantity and type of alarms being reported lncreases significantLy.) Remember, the
control room operator is unable to get out of the garden chair ora\lOid the water.
DIsturbedQule$ec~nt
Figure 4·1 The fire nose analogy
\-;
During a disturbance the control staff have two basic problems;
1. They can never stop alarm messages being generated.
2. All alarms have to be acknowledged before they can be deleted otherwise the alarm
I:;buffers overflow causing messages) some new and necessary, to be lost and pOtential
computer system J~roblems.
This situatioJ'}.,is exacerbated wh~n the nontrol staff know what'oau~ed the oondition, but
they are unable to tell the computer they know.. Thi,~.,is demonstrated in Appendix 1,
which lists part of the first 3 minutes of alarm mes~ipges from a minor dlsturbanpe in the
ESKOM interconnected network during April 1994.
The disturbance Was caused by the opening of an energised busbar isolator (link) in
error. The protection schemes at 'futuka power station detected this as a fault on the
busbars and tripped all 5generator tlreakers with conseqnenna! loss of, 1750 MegawattS,
of generation. This' minot event generated 433 alarms ln "0 mlnl.-ltes, with 7Q in the first
30 seconds as indicated in Figure 4-2. .
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Figure 4..2 Alarm rate following a minor disturba.'icqJ:
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4.6 Summary
The resetting sustained low frequenoy caused automatic load sheddil1~ to take place
which returned the system frequency to. flannal some four minutes later as indicated
Figure 4~~.
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Figul"~4..3 Power;;ystem frequency response
comparing figures 4·2 and 4~3 poe can see hOw the alarm rate ohanges as the frequency
ohanqes, The time intervals on the two graphs are not Identical but at the start of thq faurt
at 1S:2$, the alarm rate is at ,its highest, with messages stili coming It aft~r the frequ,en¢y
has returned to nOlmaI15:27. Examining the messages In Appendix 1, illustrates how
many duplicated messages are generated. If this number can be reducedwithout the lOSS
of critical information, a major step would have be1Jntaken in reduoing Jha'data oVerload
problem.
Currently no structures exist to prevent unnecessary message generation. The designers
of SCADA systems do'not 1'6co.gnisethat different network conditions require different
alarm handling and display tools, As a consequence the control staff suffer from the
uncontrolled generation ,nf alarm messages when more than a handful of electrical
dew1:es ohanqe state at the same time.
It can therefore be argued tMt the necessity for the current alarm message phil6sophy is
primarily due to poor Man Mat'~ine 'nterface ft.mctlonality. If better ways can be found of
indicnting the current state, then alarm text messages can be removed I..~ a .vlew
supported by ABB. [15].
i,/
A possible alternative to alarm messages is disoussed In chapter 6, but before that, It is
important to review the literature on the subject on Man Machine Interfaoes used in
power system control.
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s,EVALUATION OF MMI LITERATURE
5.1 ~ntroduttion
This chapter examines the literature relating to alarm data presentation and \.t;tefactors
.affectingthe design of the Mar. Machine Interface used by control staff of Elet..'tc'icPower
Systems. ,-
The available literaturs on Alarm Processing, Data Visualisation and MMI developments
wa~'Ianslyserl. The primary focus was on articles related to Expert Systems and Human
computer Interaction connected with power system control.
5.2 Generalmmosophy
Papers covering the phHosophy used in the monitoring and control of electrical pc)Ver
networks since 1976 were stutiied. An overall impression is that there has been n6 real
change irl thinking with respect to the presentation or processing of alarm data for control
$t\~ffby millnagement or vendors. The methods pf data presentation used today are still
th(~same as those defined in the proposals laid down in the EPRI report on Human
Fa~';torsReview of Electric Power control Cent! ss [1] in 1981. Max Fax8r said the same
thili(:l in 1f,l85[81in the section called the "Too-much too-Quick syndrome" on page 139
of hls paper.
5.2.1 EPRI
T~e initial detil'litive reference work on the entire subject of alarm processing was
cci~llpiledby thl~American based Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in 1981. The
report [1] is in six volumes, three detailed and three management summaries, covering aU
aspects of SCAl')A system implementation and practices for Electric Power Systems.
The EPRI report £11.pg. 2-108ldenUfied the problems assootated with alarm processing
in electriCal utilities as being :
• Inconsistent significance
• Recurring alarms
• AI~irmoverload during a disturbance
• Alal'm threshold too sensitive
• Lact\ of alarms on key parameters
• Too many alarms
• Need for more detail from substations
• Alarm display problems with paging
• Bottom lme changes too fast
From interviews conducted with ESKOM's control staff, three other SCADA users in
ESKOM and the Johannesburg Municipality, it would seem that these problems are the
same now as they were in 1981. These findings are supported by papers published up to
and including 1a95. The problems Identified in the EPRI report have been the starting
point for many of the papers covered in this review and Indicate that many people have
tried to solve the data overload problem since 1981, with little success,
One of the papers in the EPRI journal [181(DEC 1994) comments on the use of star plots
and Kiviat diagrams to facilitate the visualisation of power system varia'"' 'So The biggest
problem with this idea Is that currently the vendors of full graphic software tools do not
seem able to offer the. recommended features to the utilities.
EPRI [18] is currently sponsoring projects to develop advanced Visualisation methods
that can shorten the time needed bv power system operators to perform functions such
as system restoration.
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6..2.2 \";IGRE
5.2.3 COC
GJl.!ly.191)1i
At.the CJGRE Conference in Japan in 1987 is], Van Son at al. acknowledged the problem
in the growth of alarm data arriving at control centres reaching.upwards of 3000 alarms
per minute dudng a disturbance. The paper identified 3D graphic tools as a possible
solution for displaying some of the data. It does n.01offer any alternative ideas to the
fundamental question of how alarm data should be processed or presented to the control
staff.
In a similar report [91 on the HydrO"Quebec power system the number of alarm messages
'~enerated during .adisturbance ranges from 20 to 75 alarms per second. It is surpri&ing
tlJat the number of alarm messages generated by a SCADA system can be allowed to
r~?ch such high numbers, without anyone stopping to examine what the basic problem is
. in~~efirst place.
The ~)aperby the staff of the Control Data Corporation ['12) (1989) called IIControlling
powe\r Systems Ouring Emergencies; The role of Expert Systems" explains the data
overlO\~dproblem very well. The authors acknowledge that the primary problems faced by
oontrol;~taff aod hence by expert systems are:
\
" som~ alarm messages do not contain enough information.
.. som~, alarm messages contain too much information
• som~\alarms are needlessly repeated
• Ml.lltipi~ messages are generated for the same condition
.. The nw"nber of alarms is SOmetimes overwhelming
Appendix 1 has examples of these problems from the ESKOM network.
CDC highlight the bsstc requirements of system control during disturbances as being:
• 1<~6j) the operator aware of the most urgent matters.
e Keep the operator aware of problems as they occur.
• Reduce alarm loading and present strategic situations.
• Provide the abllity to perform deeper analysis.
The proposed CDC solution to solve the data overload problem is the installation of an
intelligent Alarm ProcessQr or :AP. The lAP takes the incoming alarm messages, filters
them and then divides them into four categories:
1. Those that need to be displayed immediately
2. Those that can be permanently Ignored
3. Those that carl be temporarily ignored
4. ThOse thf\f need deeper analysis.
An expert system is not neec;!edto dynamically filtel' alarms into four categories. Initial
analysis of the alarm data shows that alarms belong permanently to one of the four
groups. Assigning the different category to each element at data base generation time,
allows each alarm element to be sorted ar. it arrives. By pro\tiding the control staff with
four pre-defined alarm categories, one for each group, that can be called up on demand
removes the need for lAP. As for the messages that can be permaf.~ntly Ignored why not
leave them at RTU or leave them undisplayed and access them when required?
Ouring a disturbance it is the repetition of known states that causes the data overloading
as indicated by examining Appendix 1. An lAP does offer some relief by preventing
duplication of similar messages but the medium of communication between the RTU and
the control staff is still via alarm text messages and the potential power of the full graphic
MMI hardware is neither considered nor addressed.
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5..2.4 Dept. Of Electrical Engineering, W8shin.gton University
The paper "Envisioning Power System Data" published in 19~13Ie] by the staff of the
department of Electrical Engineering of Washington University discusses the use of full
graphic facilities to understand power systems. They make the comment,
liThe easier iUs to obtain insight from a computational tool, the more useful the tool," and
acknowledge that "power system data does not consist of high levels (It abstraction of the
type. that people use in the mental problem~solving process. Instead the data consists
almost exolusively of numbers".
This is the only paper that mentions mental models and data visualisation with respect to
power system control but they do not pursue the relationship between the physical model
and the data model and seem to be locked into the display of the lowest leve! of the
source data. They use full graphics for display of load flow data but ignore device state
data.
their comment fhalpower system data" ...consists almost exclusively of numbers" is
patently false. All electrical devices have numerical components, but the ratio of binary
statesJo numbers is nearly 20 to 1. Also, it is the attributes of the numerical data that
indicate the serlousness o.f the value, not the value itself. If the attributes. are not used to
indicate the limit positions of the value, the memory demands on the control staff to keep
track of all values would be completely unreasonable, For each value, there are at least 4
to 10 attrib\.lte flags that the computational tools can use to set the context of the value
both locally and remotely. When the values and the device status flags are cornblned,
greater use can be made of full graphics to match the abstraction ievel currently used by
the control staff, during the problem solution phase of a disturbance.
The paper provides ideas to display SCADA numerical values using dynamic full graphic
objects but points out that the existing methods of displaying numeric data are inefficient.
The authors touch on a number of valid aspects with regard to the presentation and
visualisation of power system data, highlighting the need to find an alternative method of
displaying data. They champion the benefits of human pattern recognition skills to solve
the problem of numerical data display but do not offer any ideas on the presentation of
alarm data. This paper is not a very satisfactory report on the USe of full graphics.
5.2.5 IEEE
A similar paper on "Modem User Interfaces" (Jan 1994) [14] refers to the 1981 IEEE
tutorial on the Fundamentals of Supervisory ContrQI systems [4], which emphasises the
lack of new thought on the practical (not theorettcal) aspects of displaying powers system
data to meet the thinking needs of the control staff. The paper commends the use of fuil
graphic workstations using the functions of Motif and X~Windows to display power system
data in an enhanced manner compared with the past. They do not consider the use full
graphics for alarm data presentation, which is the prime reason why the control centre
was created in the first place.
6.2.6 Helander
In Chapters 1 through 8 of his "Handbook ofHuman-Cotnputor Interaction" [7], Helander
takes an in depth look at all aspects of the MMI. He points the way to an alternative
method of modelling data using Metaphors and Icons. The question is raised about the
mental models used by Control Staff and others lnvolved in Human computer interaction,
among many other aspects of the MMI. There are a lot of good ideas but unfortunately he
does not deal with alarm processing per se,
5 July, 1995 22
5.3 Expert Systems
A great deal of theoretical work has been done on the potential benefits of irrlplementing
Expert Systems to assist With the processing of "alarm messages". These specific expert
systems are referred to as Intelligent Alarm Processors or lAPs. This type of expert
system has been proposed t\~ra number of years [11 and 12] as the solution to the data
ov~rtoad proble!tl. There appt.iar to be only three documented Intelligent Alarm
Processing systeme in operation in the Electric PowEll'lndustry Which are those of EDF
(Of .France) [10], Portllgal [171 and Hydro-Quebec (of Canada) [9]. These systems are
discussed below.
5.3.1 EDF
The French electricity supply utility. EDF. uses an expert system called ALOUETTE in an
attemotto shield the control staff from data overloading. The objective oft!1eit Expert
System is "to solve the problem caused by the massive arrival of alarms related to faults
occurring in the power system".
However the EOP expert system has to wait 30 seconds to allow all alarms to be grouped
into a coherent *hole before ded;'otive processing can begin. The inference engine
processes the "facts" using a rule base and provides the diagnosis of the problem via an
"idealll list of alarm text messages. Control staff however are not prepared to wait 30
seconds before they do anything. The need to take corrective action during the
disturbance is of absolute importance and can not be delayed due to expert sys~em
·5equirements.
5.3.2 Portugu~$e
The Portuguese SPARSS Intelligent Alarm Processor is expected to produce an
explanation of a serious incident within 5 minutes of the disturbance starting. The input
data to SPARSE is SCADA alarm messages with the objective of converting the flood of
messages into a Simple explanation of what happened. From the paper, it appears that
they have succeeded, but the time delay before the explanation is available is not
practical.
5.3.3 Hydro-Quebec
Tila LANGAGS expert system has been used by Hydro~Quebec since 1992. It is an
alarm diagnosis package attached to the main computer system and uses the same
SCADA alarm te>..1data that is sent to the control staff. LANGAGE does not reduce the
number of alarm rnessaqes but does attempt to provide explanations based on them. The
explanations are available to the control staff on the same screen as the incoming alarm
messages are displayed on.
One of the justifications used by Hydro~Quebec to install LANGAGS is the prevention of
damage caused by the inadvertent re~energising of faulted transformers. A different
protection scheme at the transformer, requiring manual intervention before a transformer
can be energised, would be more appropriate. The authors also note that messages get
lost during a disturbance. A possible solution is to create alarm categories based on
device type rather than on a station basis. This will allOWall transformer messaqes to be
collected in one alarm bin rather than have them split among all the stations.
5.3.4 strathclyde University
Staff at the Strathclyde University in Glasgow in 1992 [15] published an article on the
potential of Expert systems to solve the data overload problem using the APEX (Alarm
Processing Expert system) and RESPONDO (Rule. based Expert system for Power
Network Disturbance Diagnosis) programs.
In their opinion" the Expert System acts as buffer between the control system and the
operator, which digests the vast quantities of SCADA data and supports control staff in
their analysis of the system disturbance". The Strathclyde staff suggest that the CPU
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power at the ijTU is used to perform local diagnosis on the output of the protection, then
use the indioations fa "influence tAe transmission of alarm messages from the
substationll• This solution ihey indicate would "tackle the problem ofvoiumirlou5 data at
the alarm generation side." The examples given in the paper are relatooto low voltage
systems where disturbance activity is restricted to small local networks. The ideas offered
do not appear to have been tested in interconnected systems with voltages above 275
f<Vwhich cause far more messages to be generated than at low voltages.
The most signiticant comment made by the Strathclyde staff is to acknowledge
avaifability of th.e unused CPU power of the SUbstation computers. which, to date no other
author has done.
',~$:~Q)marYof Expert Systems
The most significantaspect of all the Expert System proposals (Portuguese, EDF, Hydro-
Quebec and Strathclyde) is the retention of alarm text messages from SCADA, as the
input to their expert systems. They neitber examine nor question the basic reason for the
installation oUhe Expert Syst~1l1in the first place, which initially is to reduce the quantity
of alarm text data delivered to 'fhe control staff,
By ohanging the type ornata. the point of measurement and making more Intelligent USe
of text deSCriptions to convey information to the control staff. the need for a centralised
expert system at the host computer to filter alarm data can be reconsidered.
Rule-based expert systems can provide some asslstanee to the control staff in limited
domains. However the number of rules needed to:. cover all possible scenarios in a large
power system Is so large, that it would be impossible to make an expert system cost
effective in a growing environment.
However, local expert systems situated at the RTU which deliver explanations of
electrical protection operations are possible and form part of the RTU secretary mDde
activity recommended in chapter 8 of this report.
it should be remembered that, coupled to the alarm text data is the need for an efficient
method of presentation that facilitates the rapid visualisation of'the information, which is
an essential requirement during a disturbance. At no siage. in any of the papers on
expert systems, is this addressed. The installation of a centralised expert system to
process. alarm messages is not the answer to the data overload problem. They do have a
role to play at the R'TU where they can be used for many applications including alarm
processing. However, the output would be a text message built up by the Expert System
and sent directly to the control staff via the RTU. This is discussed in more detail jf)
chapter 8.
6.4 Full Graphics
Since full graphic displays are very recent innovations in control rooms, there has not
been much experience with them nor with 'their limitations. ABS. [is] have noted the
problems associated with using full graphic hardware and identify the primary MMlneed
of the control staff as being" ...to show the operator the precise information r£quired at
any particular time - and no more."
The question of what the operator actually needs during his daily work routine is then
asked. The answer is not provided, but the ABe authors define the two major aspects of
MMI deSign as being "Information selection" and "display form".
The authors recommend solutions based on the arrangement of "windows'.' at the
workstation and the use of "fish-eye" graphics to allow greater visibility of specific network
items.
They also recommend the expedient use of expert systems and appropriate and clear
summary information derived from the large volume of data arriving. This
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, 5.5 Summary
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recommendation is qlX9st.ionable in ligt:lt ofiha Qttantities of data ..g~\lal:1rat~d'duril1g a
disturbance and indicates that the atl~hor$have little knowledge of what the. installation of
an expert system entails.
-err" :i1'..~ar poses the question ofUWhat ought to be displayed and what is the. optimum
output in terms of hurpon engineering?". The authors do not provide conc~ete solutions
but do provide guidelines for display ·staff to keep in mind when designing displayS.
The staff at EDF R&D diVision [111 noted that future higher performance computers and
Visual displays would allow " ...a better MMt, wen adapted tMha needs of the ope!1ators,
net only in lhe normal but al~'O in the emergency state and for restoration", This is the
only inslance noted which recognised that the MMII1as to cater for different operating
states,
From a review of tha.literatureJt is apparent that a lot of research andwork has berm
done in an attempt to improve the working environment of Control Staff by:;"
a) Reduoing data overloading
b) Using full graphic facilities and
c) Recommending the use Qf expert systems to provide summa~ information
\',
However. it seems that the current designs of $CADA systems are b~ed on the premise
that the'power system is quiescent. Nearly every paper complains aboutthe data
overload problem but the a.ffort to solve the problem is concentrated at the receiving end,
flow control at the source is the cfj.lcial requirement to solve the data overload problem. .
In general there does not appear to have been any cnange in the theory or practice in th:~
presentation of alarm data for use by.Contra. Staff (or as input to an Expert System)
since the initial design guidelines formlllated in the 1961 EPRI,report 1112.S}.
Solutions have been deSigned and implemented in an attempt 10 filter the data or buffer
the user from the. results. No attempt has been madSc!~ ex~mine the root causa of tlile
data overload problem nor what effect the state of the power system has on the operating
needs of the Control Stefl.
Three expert systems. have beeWdesigned.and built in an attempt to help the control staff
to understan? alarm messages, but there is no general move. by the industry to embrace
them becaU!i{e of the limitations imposed by retaining the old philosophy of using text
messages.
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e,POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE DATA.OVERLOAD PROBLEM
6.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes an alternative appro;.lCOtothe data overload problem and defines
the structures on which the new Philosophy is built.
6.2 Disturbed state
HistOrically the MMI and ALARM systems were designed on the assumption thaHhe
power network is quiescent 99% of the time with limited facilities for disturbed state
conditions. In fact, the facilities for disturbed state operation are the same as those for
quiescent operation, the size of the alarm buffers being the only concession provided for
disturbance conditiOns. Alarm messages. are generated for each and every non
commanded state change in the network and whenever an analog exceeds a limit or
returns to normal, The alarm messages are used as the primary method of notifying the
control staff of network element state changes. Therefore the root cause of the data
overloading is the uncontrolled delivery of alarm text messages and the lack of ~.: 'Y
alternative means of networl{ notification.
Any solution to the data overloading problem has to be based on the reduction of alarm
messages delivered to the control staff, but without the Joss of critical infOJTTlJ:lfionto
enable them to do their job efficiently. The solution parameters for the reduction of data
overloading can be defined in terms of a design brief.
6.3 Design Brief
"Communicate the current and potential state of the electrical power network to ti:\e
control staff as fast as pOSSible and in such a manner that they are able to appreolate the
problems and potential problems without the need for repeated or unnecessary alarm text
messages".
The solution assumes two distinct behaviour states of the power system, disturbed and
quiescent, and that the SCADA, ALARM and MMI modules of the computer system can
be changed to support these two different modes of operation. The solution is designed
to solve a disturbed state data overload condition first, with quiescent operation tools
added once the disturbed state foundation is in place.
6.4 &~Iution Mechanics
In chapter 2, the mental and concept models used by the control staff were defined as a
pyramid as per t=igure 6~1 A and B. Wrttt respect to this pyramid structure, itwas found
that 99% of the alarm messagesmakino liP the data overload problem are produced from
changes that take place at the element :avel.
New Focus
Existing
Focus
A B
Figure 6-1 Existing and new focus levels
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Re~examjning the control staff beha'Vioul'and their mental models, it was found that they
\>, are foclIsed at element level and had to use element data to determine the overall state
,_,/the device when c .in effect, they needed to be focused at the device level, with the
aoi!ity to examine a. specific element when required. See Figure 6~1 A and B.
The same ~naly$i$ revealed that a de"ice can have a number of different states,
depending upon the operauonal mode and str*e of the power network. Examining thta
elements belonging to each device revealed that the division into the threecategories
matohed the. initial mental models of the possible network activities referred to in the task
analysis. see Appendix: 3. A further division of the elements into four categories provided
a Petter structure on which to hang the device state abnormalities.
6.5 ProJ!JQ$edsolution
The proposed ~s9lution is:
1. Mov~He control staff fodtlSfrom the element level up to the device level as in Figure
e~1JY;
?~\t(de ail element data for evel'V\deViCein Appendix 2 into four categories called
- Health. Protection Main, ProtecOw'1 Backup and Information
3. Count the number of abnormal el~~ments, for each of the four categories and store the
result at the device level. \\
4. Indicate the existence of abnormal\\~lements in a category, using icons next to the
device on the one-line display, \\
5. Notify the parent level otthe eXistenc1ilof abnormal states in the current level, as per
the data pyramid. . ..
6. Allolill the control staff to. traverse the datt~~yramid and filter and suppress data
dynamically, to suit their requirements. . .
7. Limit te;xt alarms to Breaker trips, Susbar and Transformer protection messages only,
The next few paragraphs expand on these topics and provide examples of their
, Implementation.
6.6 Categories
The elements belonging to a device are divided into four categories as indicated in Table
5. The informatioll in Table 5 is taken from page 9 & 10 ofthe Telecontrol standard In
Appertdix 2 ..Each element state change causes the category counter to be updated on
the parent device, There is a separate counter for each category along with space to
store the tilTle at which the last element became SET and RESET. This require changes
to the data base structure,
Health Main Protection Backup Protection Informatioh
Pole discrepancy M2 protection trip Breaker state
..
SF6 - Urgent ~n/olosed)
SF6 - Non urgent Bus zone M2 HV lnst, 0/0 Break~rChar~~d "-
Main 1 DC fail Bus strip M2 HV backup o/c Breaker control - toea:
Main 2 DC fail M1 prote~tion trip M2 HV ElF operated Supervisory Control - On/Off
Control DC fail M1 HV Inst. ole M2 MV Inst. 'J/e Main 1 protection onloff
Close DC fail M1 HV backup ole M2 MV backup ole Main 2 protection on/off
Spring reWind fail M1 HV ElF operated M2 MV ElF operated MW jitter
Isolator DC fail M1 MV Inst. ole M2 Tertiary lnst, 0/0 MV jitter
I\C/DC conv, rail M1 MV backup olc M2 Tertiary IDMT 0/0 KV jitter
MVA 70 deg. Limit M1 MV ElF operated Neutral Earthing comp, Hz jitter
~lVA 90 deg. Limit M1 Tertiary lnst, ole Neutral Earthing React. ERTU Message
KV limit M1 Tertiary IDMT ole
Table 5 Transformer elements divided into categories
The bottom of Figure 6-3 B indicates the logic::ti arrangement needed to track the
changes in the elements.
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6.6.1 MMIindicatioo of abnormal element states
As the focus is moved to the device I~vel the oontrot staff have to be notified of the
exictenoe of abnormal elements related to;the deVice. This is achieved by assigning,.
different coloured icons to each category tillat become visible the mOment there is a
pOSitive abnormal count in the categ(j!ry fie'ld. This topic is discussed in more detsillater
on.
6.7 Abnormal counts
The abnormal counts are not limited to the device level but are propagated right up to the
top of the data pyramid. See Figure 6-2. each level has a set of category counters and
time stamp fields. The counts at each level. reflect the number of abnormal states in Ute
level below. not the summated count of all the elements owned by the level. The station
level counters indicate how many electrical objec..'tshave abnormal states, the electrical
object counters indicate how many devices have categories with abnormal counts. <
n Substations_...
hElectrical
objects ...._...
.,.if- ~:¥:" ......,.~~~1•.~u.Hbe~.:tlon c.ounts
;;:: ,"" etc, n Main Prot.
/ etc. n Ba.:kup Prot.
etc. n Information
Station
State____"it Object counts
:::"'c --=-....... n Healtl',
-'" r etc. . n Main Prot.
/ etc . - n Back'Jp Prot.
etc: n Information
Object
Sta'e-:-, Device counts
:::;::'~~~ nHealth. ~r; ~ '. n Main Prot.
f .;etc. n Backup Prot.etc. . n Information.1 Devices_..,..
1f'"
~ Element
State counts
__ - - ~ n Health
.- .- 1- n Main Prot..--.c n Backup Prot.
.... " n Information 11"
~ Four /'
Cat~gories
'--~
Element data by category
Device Element
state counts..--i hH •• 11h_. - _.,.. oM'.in Prot.
-..... n Backup Prot .
.... ' n Information·
'----......--J
Element da I:a by catego~'Y
L...... ---,._ ........ --- -___.".~ __ ---'- -_-l
Figure 6-'-\ Graphical model of th~ proposed data stn~(:ture
II July, 1996 28
6.8 Text af'8fltn·messages
As 1tl,~liItlonedin Chapter 1, ollrrently, every time an element changes state; it causes an
alarm text message to be created and delivered. Control staff stili need 10 be notified by
teXfi message an(!i audible tOA.S of the existence of specific devi0Eilstate changes that
e1f~~the state of the: netwCtrk, but not each and every minnr element ohange.
=;
'rae .praposed solution limits the automatic production of text alarm messages to just
t1'U-eetypes ;
1. All breaker trips
2. All l3\Jsbar zone protectlc'., operations,a. All fransformer protection operations
This subset of alarm messages represent the trigger that wams the control staff of
poteAtlally serious network problems and draws their attention to the site in question, All
'1ther a;t\rm abnormal G"ates are indioated by the category loona next to the relevant
dGvice at the devloe level. Since the existence of abnormal st~: as is provided at esoh
level Qt the data pyramid, the control staff are able to see whe "G they have problems and
In Which category. This allows them to selectively e)'.amlne the problem. when time
permits, knowing that they will be warned audibly if 'there are any disturbance related
messages.
Restricting the text messages requiring manuat acknowledgement and deletion
represents a major reduction In the potential data overloading during a disturbance
withOut the loss of ability to get information when required
Lists of alarm actions are still vitally Important and they can be produced on demand via
the MMI secretary mode tools on the workstation, Control sta·ff have the ability to filier the
alarm lists to suit their needs depending upon the network activity and the demands from
management. This faollity puts them in control of tile data they need when they need it.
>(6.9 Qata~tructurechanges
In the existing hierarchical data base a pseudc-rnodel of the network is supported as
indjcated in Figure 6·3 A. However provlslcn is only made for element data modelling.
IThe changes needed to support neW philosophy are indicated in Figure 6-3 13which
\ matches the pyramid data structure mentioned In Figure 6..1. The entire tree structure l,
'\)defined In Figure 6-2. Note how the abnormal counts are accumulated at each level.
I Slation record _.,.. Sialkln
Parent dllvic;e record \lith
no overall dovlce stalQ
A • Cla$$lc~IItQ$t data baso structure
!;tamonts records ...
Elam~mt$ divided and grouped
Inlo Dna of foUf categories ....-- 1·Eleroo.ntAnalogcontrolete,
Region Regionstateand count
rl;lcortls ..... of ebnQmlal slatklns
Slatton slale elld count of
Stl;ltlon record _..,.. Ilbnormal ellwtrldll obJ®ts
Electrical obJ$ct Illata
Electrical obJecl record -...... and abnormal dOl/ice counl$
Pllront dllvlc;e record \lith ,___- .....
dQvlce lIIal& and cat!lilory counts
Figur*il e-a Co ""'uarison of the ~las$ical and proposed data structures
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6.10 Communicatioo··(tycles
To support the MO modespf,:'oetwork bahaviour (di~turbed and quiescent) and to allow
the focus of atten~ion to be moved to the device Ie-vel. requires changes In the data
acquisition philosophy as well. The changes amount to creating two different data
acquiSition cyoles called ctasst and Clsss2 •.where Ctass1 is used to acquire device levAI
and category count data, and Class .2 is. used to fetch and deliver element data, Class 1
data messages not only deliver device level data but inciude the device category counts
and associated time stamps as Indicated in Figure 6-4.
Figure 6-4 Model of the two t:ycle data acquisition mode
Keeping in mind the disturbed state design philosophy. the category counts in Class 1
messages are used in two ways, one to advise the data acquisition software to solicit the
assoclated category data and secondly by the MMI to indicate the exlstenoe ofabnomlal
elements by category on the displays. These two aspects are dlsoussed in more detail in
the next two sections. . "
6.10.1 Communication network loading
Dividing the data acquisition into two modes, allows the urgently needed Class 1 device
state data to be delivered to the control staff without the communlcationsi1etw~rk being
slowed down by the clutter of Class 2 element data until actually required. Changes in the
category counts sent as part of the Class 1 device iaval dnto are used by the front end
data acqulsltton software at the h~-)t to request the delivery of all the element data for-the
device.
The changed elements are not transferred on their own, the entire category set is sent as
a Class 2 single packet Since the overhead to send a single packet is the same as it is to
send an entire category. There are also maintenance reasons why category data should
be transferred as a whole. This is discussed in more detail In sectlon 6.15
An example of the two DAQ cyoles is shown In Figure 6·4.
Using two different DAQ oycles. eYfectively delays the delivery of element state changes
to the host. but as the ERTU stores beth set and reset times for each element, there is
no need to move the element data to the host immediately. The element change time
stamping is carried out at the er:tTU. not at the host. Class 2 element data remains .at the
ERTU until requested by the nost, The host uses the category count changes in the
Class 1 message to post Class 2 requests.
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The host issues Class 2 requests whenever there are no more Class 1 changes, orwhen
control staff specifically request the Class 2 categor.y set. There will of cour~e be a short
time delay following a demanded request for a category set. but this delay is acceptable
as dlsturbance Class 1 device state Information is not hald up by quiescent system
needs. Class 2 data. is transferred almost immediately if there are no outstanding Class 1
messages.
6.11 MMllcons
The second use of the category counts is to indicate the existence of abnormal elements.
The MMI uses the positive catego~y counts to display coloured icons next to the device
as Indicated in Figure 6-5. The existence of one or more category icons notifies the
control staff of~~e existence of one or more elements in the abnormal state. Device and
element leveH:;aiegory data is then displayed on demand by selecting either the category
icon or selecting the device which will bring up all the elements divided by category,
During a disturbance when there would be a large number of icons on display, the control
staff make use of the secretary mode tools to filter and suppress the icons on the one-
line displa,s to suit thair needs. Sincl;! the existence of abnormal states is known at each
level of the daia pyramid, Control staff do not have to examine each station to see what
devices have abnormal states. The ability exists to create selected lists of elements in the
abnormal state. The secretary mode actioflS are explained fully in Chapter 8.
Popup window
showing elements
divided by categorr~6
Figure 6M5 Category iCOhs and as,~ociate.Jpopup window
An element In the apl10rmal state is lnoicated by the backgroUnd text defining the
element beill9 invected. This is'indicated in the element called "Main 1 DC faU" in Health
categooJ shbwn In Figure ~~5. Once the element state is acknowledged the uackground
colour will slowly become grey. They ql.lanUt'Jof grey is a function of the time since the
element was acknowledged. This match the Icon duration next to the device.
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6.11.1 ICOll duration
One oHM main aspects of the proposed solution is the storage of the tima_lNhen the
element or device state Dhanged. This provides the key for the Control s\~if to know the
age of an event and al(;Jw time based functions to be used to control the display of dataon the one-line displays.
The MMI is designed on the assumption of a disturbed state and each icon will
automatically disappear after a pre-set time. The visibility period can be changed by the
control staff when needed via the secretary mode tools. The quiescent setting for an
abnormal icon Is 15 minutes and after the time has elapsed t~,e icon disappears.
,(
Control staff can regenerate the category icons by replaying the icons activity via the MMI
secretary mode tools. TnJS r~,quires Changing the display mode temporarily and using
scroll bars to replay the state change actions using the stored time data. .
It is possible to have a non disappearing mode, i.e, an infinity time out, activated on
demand when the need arises.
6.11.2. flashing leans
In order to ensure the control staff notice a new icon, the initial output mode wi'J be
flashing. The use of advanced MMI facilities can have the slze of the icon and 'he flash
rate change over time, with the initial Size being larger and becoming smaller as time
progresses until it eventually disappears. The flash rate and the size can be combined to
indicate different conditions.
The Icon will stop flashing underthree ..conditions:
• if the categ~)I'y or device is acknowledged via the ackn(;wleclge button (Figure 8-5.)
It if the tlashing option is deselected on the display.
e if the auto acknOWledge option Is selected with a givan tlme out period.
This solution goes a lorig way to solving the data overload problem by reducing the
quantity of messages sent to the control staff and allowing them to controlthe data they
need.
The implementation otthe solution requires changes to both the host and'ERTU.The
hOst changes involve the; creation and inclusion of two new record type9 9sUed REGION
and ELECTRICAl_ OBJEOT to be inserted as per Figure 6~1. Since DEVICE records do
not exist at the ERTU, they need to be created and added to the ER'fU data model.
6.12 Additional Fields
Additional data fields are needed on aUthe records in the data pyramid in the host data
base. These changes enable the tracltlng of category changes as they occur at the
ERTU Which requires similar changes to element and device records.
By moving the focus up to the DEVICE leve!, the exact behaViour of the elements will be
lost unless provlslon is made at the ERTU and thq host to store tl1e time and state
changes as and wMo th~ monitored element chan,~\~d.
1,
This is ~;rnilar to sequ~~ce~of-event r.ecoj'dirJg,,~whichis handled by a separate task in the
ERT6, in that th!i(e jl; .:1 limited buffer for each el..ement that has space for 8 state aod
time stamps, If the 0uffer overflows the mast recent 0 state Changes are availab!{1.
Analog elements use the time stamp cell~ to store the time When the analog value
exceeded the high limit and when it returned to normal. The hlstorlca state and time
stamp fields are not stored as part of the device only the current state Is kept there, the
rest cfthe data is kept in a relational data base that is accessed on demand by the MMI.
The details of the additional fields are defined in the nEl>d paragraphs.
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6.12.1 Additi~l)~llllQ,$t;r.eld$
T:1l~~~$ic .additional fields added to tl1e host data base records are indicated in Table 6
" 'tbe tlel~$.~re;
1. !~tiJiTlestamp field to slare 'lM! time and date when the monitored state changed to
;$l1i'l' 01' exoeeded a.ltligh al(~rrl~limit •
•~ itA time stamp fil:lId to store fn0r.~time and date when the monitored state. changed to
'R8'SEr or returned to norm,~1.
iA "preselilCe II or active!hit tf!16t defines whether or not the record is commissioned at
'the RTU, This Bf:lplies mainl~! to el.ements but is applicable to all records including the
. st~tion record. ;.' n
4. A bit ll1dloatiag if the record i~\the head of a oategory (nor«)ally only applicable to an
elemeat reoord ).
5. A pointer to the location in thel,relational data base for the last 15 minutes of element
history minutes 01"to the Ilist 1~)element state changes.
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State SET state REi:SET Category rointerto
timestamp timestamp indicationbit historicaldata
'\ Table 6 Additional fields needed on·aU host data base records
J)
On the device, object, station and region record, four category integer counter fields· and
iii state field are required. Each of the catetlory fields require twO' tim~.s,tamf.t records to
traok tile time at which counters ohanqed.
In addition to the category counters on the st~tion, region and network records, there are
also cross reference ot,lject counters that track the total number objf:Qis that have
elements in the abnormal state by category for each pyramid level. there are 9 basic
object types Le., busbars, couplers, lines, transformers, loads, generators. capacnors,
reactors and SVCS. The counters for these objecfl~. are UPdated as the elements Change
and a~eused by the control staff!o determine the i?\lectrical equipment with problems and
in which categories. C .
T~a"cross reference counters are displayed in the "Associated level category counts"
~jeld as specified at the top of Figure 7~1. The values l~ the counts change as the control
$t~ff move up and down the data pyramid and track th~lcounts in the level dynamically.
The time stamp fields· for each device category are used to trace times when the
Gategol)l count was set and when the count is eventually reset to zero as indicated in
Table 7.
Number of abnormal
elements in tOElHealth
category
Number of abnormal
elements in the Main
Protectlcm catl';gory
Number of abnormal Number of
elements In thi~ Backup abnormal elements
"r"tactlon cab~90ry in the Information
category
Tlable 7 Category field layQut.
Figl..f'I..'0"6 shows a putse trace Of a selected number of elements. 'rhis is one of the
secretary mode tools that allow the control staff to obtain a very QUil1k picture of what
happened amongst selected eleme~ts or devices. Multiple state changes are kept in the
associated relational data base and '~re accessed on demand when pulse data Is
required. Only a latest set and reset times are stored in the SQAOA data base with the
hlstorlcal data stored in the reiationsil data base,
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The generatioft of the pulse trace is a secretary made function used to deterrnine
sequenoe,.of~event behaviouratter the event and is performed in an aff-line: mode,
MOhitored
element
traces
Category
SET time
category
R~SETtlll'le
6.12.2 Additional ERTUfields
The additional fieldS needed at the ERTU are:
11 A time stamp field to store the tir1;leand date when the state of trie element or device
chanqedro SET or exceeded a high alarm limit.
2. A time stamp field to store the time and date when the state of the element otdevice
changed to RESET or returned to normal.
3. A "presence II. or active bit that defines whether Of not the element or device is
commissioned.
4, FOUi category integer counter fields are required initially on each device. Future
growth must be catered for and at least 4 more categories should be aVailable.
5. Pointer to the location in the data base where the last 8 state changes and time
stamps are stored.
J---- Elemer,t state
~ __ Element state
OVlilrall category state
6.,13 Host changes
once the extra records and fi~lds nave been added, the changes needed In the host
SCADA data base are:
e All elements and analogs are moved ancii~ll(ed to their f)arent device.
• Elements are divided and grouped into categories. .
• The electrical object, station and region records are IInl<.egto their Child records as per
the physical structure at the station as indicated in.
• Code is added to track and update the counters for eaon category on the device
record, (Initially this code can be added to the host q.lIt eventually it would be installed
at the ERTU).,Simllar code will update the counters at the object, station and region
records to reflect ',·I.e totals below each record.
• Code is added to store the last 16 element and analog changes receive-d from the
ERTU in a relational data base accessible by the MMI.
• The full graphics displays are modified to have adifferent icon for each oategory
displayed next to the device, object, station and region If there are elements in thel
abnormal state in the source category
Time
Figure 6-' ExamplQ of pulse trace behaviour
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• Tools are created and addf)d to th~ full graphics displays to allow the control staff to
disPlay the contents of a category hy selecting the iCOnor the device to see the €lntire
element set. Ii
ill each MMI workstation has Ifsecret~lry mode" tools to suit the needs otthe Oontrol staff
and state of the power system. TM changes to the MMl are explained in detail in
chppter&.
6.14 ERTU changes
once the device record and the extra fields have been created, the structure and
software needed at the ERTU must be changed as follows;
II» Element and analog data is divide.d, grouped into categories and wired up according
to the order in the Teleoontrol Standard. If specified elements are not available,
spaces are left for them and the presence bit is set to zero. This is a crucial point in
the deSign as regards dual host access and on-line maintenance.
e Code is added to track and count the number of elements in the abnormal state in
each category for each devlce in the ERTU. The counts and time stamps are updated
whenever an element changes state. This change tracking code is initially installed at
the host and moved to the ERTU once the communications protocol has been
updated.
• The data acqUisition processing is modified to transfer the category counts and time
stamps with the devloe state whenever the device state is scanned or polled.
• Code is added to save the time state and time stamp When each element and analog
changed in a buffer that holds the last 8 Changes.
• The ERTU has "secretary mede" software programs to provide additional $ervices te
the control staff during qulescent periods and advise them of potential problems
dUling disturbances. This is <.IiSbussed in chapter S.
6.15 Maintenance
''linten.ance is one Of the biggest areas of concern in large Energy Management
Sysn~ms. Tile eSKOM ER1Us are accessed by more than one control centre, which
causes serious problems when new points have to be commissi<med. The problems start
with the need to ensure that the plant data is correctly wired up to the ERTU for access
by multiple host computers at the same time. How are new configurations of the ERTU
synchronised for all users at the same time?
The propos~d SOlution recognises the need for parallel commissioning activity and allows
multiple host data bases to commission new points at their own pace. The first
requirement is that each device has the category data built in the same way in all the
relevant data bases. including the ERTU before Rny element is commissioned at the
ERTU.
The desIQI;tl$ aimed at reducing the maintenance load at the different host computers by
using a standard IElyout for all elements; wired to similar devices. All missing or future
elements must be wired to the ERTU. Parallel to each element state is a presence bit.
These presence bits are applicable to the device and element records at both the ERTll
and the host. see Figure 6-7.
The benefits of standardising the element name order I'il the ERTU and the host are:
• There is no need to have. a separate MMI display 10 for each element.
• AU elements have the ~ame pre-defined position in the category which is the same for
aU similar devices.
• Tllere is no need for majo)' data base update to commission a new element because
the element already exists in the data base once the device record has been defined.
To comrnlsslon an element, all that is required is that the element is wired up. and tested
locally and the 'presence' bit is set to the active state at the ERTU.
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At first glance the advantage of not needing to have separate MMllDs for each element
is not appreciated until one considers the space required to display element data and the
time it takes to add new pOints to the data base. By grouping the element data into pre
defined categories at the ERTU and the host allows the mapping of the individual
elements to be pre-defined ID text displays,
As specified, the order of the elements is the same in each category for similar devices.
Thus, at display time, the elements for a given device can be displayed in the same
format using pre-defined 1extwindows. There has to be an identical copy of popup
windows for each category, device, object, station and region on each workstation with
the pre-defined text or symbols in it.
At run time, when the category elements are displayed, the element order, state and
'. (presence bits are used to tailor the popup, to match the state otthe data and display it
correctly.
Pre-defined list
of element ID text
in a popup window
State Bit
controls the
colour and text
of the element
Presence bit
controls the
grey out
Health category popup window illustrating
the use Of the presence bit and state bit
Figure 6-7 Exampie of the presence bit in use
Control staff know that the order of element information is always the same for Similar
devic4'ls. Non commlssloned elements are (eft out and elements in the abnormal state
t>ave the background colour behind the text il1verted as indicated in Figure 6-7. .
When new equlprneat is added at the substation, a data base update has to be done at.
the host to add equivalent device records. The elements, category details are added
automatically when the device is sudeci: The presence bit~ on the device and individual
elements are used to ct., •••",I how these items are displayed on-the Screen at runtime. If
the presence bit is inactive, the MMI will display the relevant device or element in grey
out mode. When elements get commissioned at the substation the 'presence' bit is set to
active at the ERTU making the device or element potentially visible on the screen, Setting
the matching presence bit at the host to active, completes the data path and the relevant
element or device becomes visible and usable by the control staff of the different control
centres.
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This techniQ4e allows the different control centres to activate new elements, devices or
electrical objects at their leisure t::goviding th~0the relevant record is active at the ..cRTU
and that the host data base has been updated. For this philosophy to work, it is essential
to have an agreed wiring standard in place and used by all ERTUs.
6.15.1 Plant c.ommissioliing
'fhe plant commissioning stage of new equipment can also be reduced by negotiating
with the vendor of the equipment to have the interface cables from his equipment to the
bay processor match a standard wiring code. This will allow plug compatibility to be
instituted across all equipment of the same type. The saving in commissioning time and
labour charges will be enormous as there is no need to wire out each element state from
the plant cable to the ERTU. The vendors cable is plugged in 1..111 ectly to the bay
processor and tested automatically from the ERTU using software programs.
6.16 Exanlple
Using the conditions in Appendix 1, to demonstrate what the control staff would see USing
the new philosophy, the alarm data sent to the control staff would be combined by the
ERTU to form the following messages;
15.23:27 *4 TIJTUKA MAJUI31_ BKR, 1/ -;OSEC 1 & 2, UNIT 2_ 400 BUSZONE
...I0nsS, 6,.TRIPPED ON R .VERSE POWER
15:23:31 *4 MAJUBA TUTUK1_BKR TRIPPED - CARRI~R_R_EC_E_I_V_ED ~ ---l
Returning to Appendix 1, the frequenpy analogs on the one-line displays would all be in
red indicating a low frequency, but there would not have been any alarm text messages
sent to the control staff. They would always be a member of the control staff monitoring.
the frequen~y who would react accordingly and notify the.rest of the shift.
The next three Breaker close messages w'Juld be logged with explanations using the
element detailS (if they were available). H,)wever in the example there are no indication
as to wllat caused the devices to close. 11 'l text would be the same as it is in Appendix
1,
RUSCM_£:JKR
TUTUK1_BKR
SVC.2_CX3_BKR
~):23:34 *4 TRIDENT
15:23:35 *4 MAJUBA
1~:23:41 *4 HYDRA
The next phase of the disturbance involves automatic load shedding causing the
follolNing messages to be logged.r-----------------~------------~~----~--~~~~----------.15:23:42 *4 APOU~O CNVRT FILTR2_BKR TRIPPED on Under frequency
15:23:42 *4 AVON UMGEN 1 s 2 BKRs TRIPPED on Under frequency
15:23:42 *4 AVON STANG 1 & 2_BKRs TRIPPED on Under frequency
15:23:45 *4 HYDRA SVC2_CX3 ....BKR TRIPPED on Under frequency
15:23:47 *4 KOMATIPOORT INFLN_BKR TRIPPED on under frequency
i5:24:29 *4 IMPALA PONGL & HILLV BKRs TRIPPED on Under frequency
15:24:31 *4 MULDERSVLEI TRFR 4 & 5 (66 Kv) BKRs TRIPPED on Under frequency
Effectively the first 106 messages from Appendlx 1 would be reduced t012 text
messages. They provided the control staff will the necessary level of detail without
unnecessary clutter. The icons next to the relevant devices would t~ displayed and
automatically cleared as the system stabilised. The control staff would be able to
generate· the various message listings, Similar to Appendix 1, depending upon what they
needed. In general the critical iQformation was providf';('j in the form of messages and the
existence Of abnormal elements in the form of iCc:'is, providing the control staff with the
ability to see the detail when required.
G July, 19115 37
~7~m_~ ~
ThiS ohapter has proposed a solution to the data over loading problem. The' So!utiol~~is
based on the mental modol of the,.power system data py,ramid .alild .reql:liFes a Gertailli
amount of restructuring of the host and ERTU data bases. Once the host data baae has
been chali1g~ so that there are distinct levels, the fecus of aitetltiOB is moved from tlile
e~ement level up to the device level. 111e sOlution also reqUires the siandarcfisatiGo oHhe
elemellt prder for each ·de\liGe 8l1d,tl1eir gr.oupil'lg into oategaries, bath at the ERTU and
the Host.
The device record at both the host and ERTU Is ch~ngedto inolude the number M
elements per category in the abnormal state. The data acquisition retrieves the device
state and the oategory det.a.ils as o~,e pass and uses ohanges in the category counts tof~~:!~~~!~:::!:b~sr:frt~r~~~~rl~~~~~:~P~::~ i~~~'~fT~~r~~~n~::r: i e
the logged messages in AppendiX 1 w~re used to demonstrate how the number of
mecsages are reduced/The ERTU combines the element information from the device to
oonstruct a text n~essage with additional information end send it to the host.
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7.1 IntroducticUl,
It:!the previous ohapter dett'lIs were given of the data structure at the ERTU and the host.
Mentioll was made of pyramid structure and how the category counts are propagated to
tU.Q:Ii;}vel Qb.)ve. This ohapter explains how these category counts are used by the MMI
and<li(;)w. the MMt is used by the control staff to cpntrol the data displayed and the options
,~va.II~bledurlt1@tRe two distinct network operating modes,
7~a·gI~avi~~',~bil~$0phY
In clq$.SicalSCADA systems the behaviour of one-line displays cannot be controlled or
modified by the user at run time, However, in line with the philosophy of giving the user
control of the data sent to him, facilities are provided to change the display ancl:the data
"to suit his needs and the state of the power system. The difference between the classical
al.splay philosophy and the proposed solut,on is defined in Table a.
Classicai MMI
There is an additional plant model between .,.......
1M displays and the SCADA data base that
supports network connectivity
New MMI philosophy
Oisplays are built from the SOADA data
base with no knowledge of the actual
network. connectivity Or topology.
Displays are gompiled off-line and stored
on the host. At. run time the display is
down loaded to the host and updated
every 4 seconds
Displays are builtoff-line but propagated to
all workstations. At run time all SCADA data
Is transferred to the workstation. The
changes cause the MMI to display the icons
next to the appropriate devices.
Alarm messages are built for every state Icons are used to indicate element changes.
change and analog limit excursion. Control staff generate alarm lists on d~mand.
All iiiarm messages have-t;-o"":'b-e---'--------t-A:-;I:--arm--s-a--r-e-a"":ut~o-m-at;-ic-l:l7."!ly-a-c7k-no--w-=l-ed7"g. ..e"":'d-a-=ft-er l
acknowledged from the alarm list; a pre-set interval or manually by selecting
the icon or device.
No ability to channe the dispiay
behaviour
Filters are available to tlte Control staff to
dynamically alter the displays. The filters are
based on the data pyramid levels, the
categories and busbar voltages VlsllJltI on the
display at run time.
No time line faeiltties
\\
A cievice event tillle line (similar to alarm list)
is visible that allows the tracking of the
device changes over a time period relative to
the contents of the display. The range of the
time line and its content are selected and
based on the time stamp data stored in the
relatiOilal data base on the workstation.
There are query faCiilties------i-AIE,rm lists can be generated by query based
on the contents of the display, the data
1-- ---- -- -J...t..py:<.:r..;.;am.,.;,;..;.;id,..;.l.:...ev.;..;e,..;.ls...a; ,.;n:~! cat gori s __
Table U Comparison of the differences between classical and the new MMI.
7.3 Now MMI philosophy
Classically tile CRT Is used to display data from the host with no abmty to act
Independently of the host. The dynamic needs of the control staff are not cOO$ider~d and
the best common denominator is used to define the contents of each oneMlinf'Jdisplay,
which tended to add fuel to the data over:oad tire during a,tjisturbance, An alternative
method of data display Is needed to assist the control staff with ~he monitoring orthe
power system.
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Tt:l~ pliilosaphy prQP6SeS a different approaoh that regards the wOrkstatfon window as a
.WQr.~beRchCCJAsistirn qf a number of input and Gutpa! areas. In ~~e oemre is the primary
0m'e"lil!ledisplay outJ:>. area and around the periphery are the related and assg¢iated
Ql1ItPutareas as indioated in Figure 7-1. '
7.3.1 ¢t~tp(ttIt:iaw~
t~~·~ssooiated output view areas are:
, OIlf1tent category counts for the' pyramid level visible on the one-line display area
.' Network navigation window
• Region navigation window
• l..iS1of the previous 20 one-line displays referenced
III Time line window
'" Alarm Sin notification area
The 'n\Jut view areas are:
" Category filter selection
.• Alarm message query and Secretary mode functions
I. Display controls
" Time line controls
• Supervisory control and data entry input window
Figure 7-1 MMI Work bench layout
The view areas are updated when E.lier a new one-line display is placed' in the one-nne
output window.
1.4 MMI Data flow
As Indicated in Table V, there Is a complete nodal based plant model of $C ~DA system
between the SCADA data base and the one-line displays on each worl,statiot~ as shown
in Figure 7-2.
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Element data,. devloe state and c~tegory coams are sent from the $CADA data base to
each workstation connected to the host whenever there is an element change. It Is the ..[\
responsibility of the MMI softWare on each workstation to update the category counte ai;"
each level in its plant model to match the network behaviour.
Changes in the plant model cause the graphloal model to be updated based on "if-,
change" logiC in t~e plant model. Each one-line d:Splay has a list of dlspls}; attributes mat
retain the state anhe display ",hen it was ia~(caUed up on the workstation. These
attributes settings are restor~~ to the relevant output views when the displa.,' is called up,
Figure 1-2 Logical data base strl.lcturas at the hostltlld workstations
7.5 Output behavioue- on display can·up
When a display is loaded into the one-line w~':k area.the workstati(l!'1 MMI has to
determlne the state of the associated ouipul views and update them acq'prdingly as
indicated In Figure 7...3: "
EaCh view is updated in pardllel when the one-nne display is r()qu~sted. The output views
are changed to reflect the previous stored settings last used and the current values of the
dynamic valuEls. l.e,
• New category counts for the associated level being displayed
tI Grey I)ut of all the electrical objects buttons not represented by the current on-llne
display
• Time line events acc:)rding to the time range and category selection flags associated
with the current one-line display
• Update the navigation windows to reflect the position in the network that is on display,
Once th~ output areas have been updated the user can alter the display by changing ihe
input viEiwvalues.
7.6 Input view areas
The Input view areas are:
• Category filter selection
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• Alarm message query ahcl secretary mode area
• Display controls
• Time Une controls
The content of these view areas allow the control st?ffto affect the behaviour of tile
Otltput views. ThE' view functions are detailed below;
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
~~"'<----.
Last 20 a:::wsa~
displays
Figur9 7..;J Data flow when a display in called in to the work area
7.6.1 Category Filter
the buttons allow the user to eithl\)r display or hfde category icons on the display
7.6.2 Alarm query
This view allows the control staff to generate a listing of alarm text messages based on
selected criteria. The last < 18 state changes of each element are stored in a relational
date. base that i$ used to satisfy time based queries. The options are:
• Sy Time ( in the range specitied)
• ay,~-ategory type
• By electrical Objee'( type
., B:i( Voltage level
1t By regHm, or station, or object or devioe
In r,ddition the user can set up pre-defined sets of conditions and save them by name.
Saved queries are acUvated by selecting the saved name from the alarm bip,output \l1~M
Dt the bottom of the screen, r)e output from the query is a display oontaining the
selected alarm message text data which can be printed as required.
7.6.3 Secretary mode
Th!S activity allows the control staff to set up a series of functions to be performed on the
plant model data so as to advise them of states in the network, region, station, object or
devicl'! that he requires. This activity is covered in more detali in the next chapter.
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7.6.4 Display controls
These funotions aHowthe oontrol staff to chQilge the data on the display by using
oondltionsln the plant model. The options available are :
(I lndloate the range'.)f proteotlon operation on an electrical ohject or station or network
• Connectivity tracing of a selemtJd obJeet
• ' Grey out (<tr reduce the visibility) of devlces, objects or stations according to the
selection criteria.
• Declu\ter the display by removing text, analog end oategory indications.
.. Tum off all flashing Indications
aefore the effects of the display oontrols can be demonstrated it Is necessary to d~tlne
!he layout of a one-line display.
1.'1 On~..line dS$play representati9"
Fililure 7-41$ an axamplEMlfthe one-llns diagram of a substih'.I~'as seen by thticontrol
$ta,f::; The diagram consists of two sets of busbars, each with a busbar couplet and two
transformers ooupling the busbars together. There are three feeders connected to each
bus with a QI!S section coupl~r on the lower 400 KV busb~r.
Figure 14 Example of a one..line display with grey out and icon Indications
The diagram represents a situation where there has been a fa~.t on the 4QOKV busbar
and the bus zone protection has operated causing the feeder. the transformer and the
bus section breakers to trip. As a consequence of the transformer tripping, the load
across the second transformer has exceeded the high limit, resulting in the analog value
being displayed In yellow. The consequential category Icons are dlspl~yed I1El.xt to the
relevant devices.
i$~h el~:otr,igal ~t>~,et'td~\li'(;!1Z ~mdanalqg are deflnediQr d!s~lay pu,:pQses using unique
graPfilio1 symbols and colours;
A·< "
.. areaker . ReCtangle(Red~Qlosed, Green;::; open)
" , f,.inlSlqlsconnectDiamond (Red':; closed, Graen Open) ..... .
~.\~iQ~ ~e~ment~ Lines ( soUd:.:on load. dotted :.:dIScQnrtect~)
.. a~~,~l:\rs Narrow reotangles coloured aocordlFlg to vriltaQs,
.. AM16gs Numbers (Blue in limits, red:::; exceeded liMits
1.7.1 Voltage Uol~.ltl"
~~~f1'~leotnQalobjeot fsras$oofated with a bus bar and voltaoe, The busbars are (''lDloLJred
a~llonjih9to the voltaga as follows;
las KV Magenta
400 KV Gr-sen
27'5J22:0 KV orange
132KV Cyan
SSKV Blue
II .
V$lng the vIewing ,toolsJhe control staff osn ohange the details of the one~line.display as
required. .
u
7.8 VtewhlQ cOrit)"QI$
The advantages of the plant rt'Iodel allows the control staff to examine the effects of the
G'OrnneotMtybetween the different electrioal objects. Without the plant model, it would be
impossible to determine the effect of protection operation on the power netwQr~, ner how
a' purtlowl~r transmissioilline is connected in a station or a region. The plMt model allows
the control staff to see the protectial'l operation effects graphioally by changing the
background behind a feeder or transformer dynamioally on demand as inciloatad in Figure
70.4, '
By ollanglng the bao.l(ground behind the electriCal objeots allows the oontrol·staff to obtain
a very quiok understanding Of the pro~eotionoperation "in-context" wlth the state Of the
network and not have to wade through miles of text messages to determine the ourrent
state.
7.9 Summary
This cnapter explained the layout and struoture of the workstation and how the contcal
staff have different input and output windows through whicll they oontrol the data on
display by manipulating th~"'tlifferent options available. in the Input views. Details are
provldfld of the tools the used to control the one-llne display to match the operating
needs of the system. An example Is provided of how the one ..Unedisplay would be O!.,ltput
following a busbar strip using the protection information to change the display .
baokground around thellfiEtmed eleotrlcal objects on view.
a,SECRETARY MODE FUNCTIONS
8.1 Introduction
This ohapter e.xamines the role Of an Intelligent system. located at the ERTU and the tYPE
of functions that such a system can perform and how they interact with the control stgff a
the oontrol centre.
8.2 Secretary acti.QIl:s
In most business organisations the manager has a sJ~£l"_etarywho's task it is, to provide a
number of services such as:
• ~hield the manager from unimportant phone calls.
• Take messages for delivery later on
., Make appointments
• :Advise the manager of meetings and events
• Type letters and reports
• 00 searches for specific things
• construct cross references of various documents
For example, a manager, one can assume, has requested the secretary to "hold all calls"
under given circumstances,
It can also be assumed that the secretary "knows" that calls from certain people have
more weight than others or provided the caller u$;wJhe correct "passwords" such as
"very urgent", "flre" or "life and death". Under these c~ntJitions, the secretary has implicit
permission to interrupt the manager and put the phone call through to him.
This simile could be taken a bit further. if the ERTU is equipped with sottware that can
detect when the rate-of-change ()f a particular valu~ is about to exceed a previously set
limit, callsing a breaker to trip. The ERTU Can use this information to formulate and send
a text message to the Host advish.g the control staff of the impending event.
The first point to remember is the ERTU would initially have raised a Health flag against
the device in question. If there is no change within a given time period the ERTU has the
ability to raise the state of the alarm to' a higher level, which it can do, by setting a station
level alarm element. the last stage Is to formulate and send a complete "text" message
whiCh can, if needed an audible alarm can be attached to it. It would be up to the control
staff to take the necessary action to prevent the breaker form tripping if possible.
"Secretary Mode" activity is the result of intelligent system software installed at the ERTU
and the host .The results from the Intelligent System at the ERTU are passed to the
control staff via the SCADA, the ALARM and the Man Machine Interface.
8.3 The role of intelligent systems
A lot of time and money has been spent implementing E..'!pert Systems for use in alarm
processing with the Expert System centrally situated at the Host, For any Electricity Utility
alarm processing Expert System to function correctly, the Host must have ALL the
required data and be able to deliver a solution in real time. ihis is not really possible
since the Expert System requires a valid network state in order for the rules to work
correctly. During a disturb~nce, the coherent network state needed for topology
processing tJsually takes between 10 to 20 seconds to achieve from the time the last
breaker tripped. Thus a disturbance lasting minutes, effectively disables the expert
system using topOlogy software, until the last Breaker trip message has been delivered
and a scan of all the analogues has been completed.
Since RTUs now have more CPU power, there is every reason to split up the Intelligent
System logio between the ERTU and the Host. This provides far more opportunities to
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imp!em~nt simple rule based algorithms at both the Host and the ERTU. Apart from the
CPU power available, the ERTU has its own data base whiGh is updated with live 1:Iata
between 1 and 5 milli-seconds. Adding code at the ERTU to process the live data will
allow local algorithms to perform such activities as ;
.. Local "simple" state Estimation or Power balancing
For example, apply Ohm's and Kirchoff's laws to aUelectrical objects for exempts,
feeders, transformers and bus bars at the station. The benefits are indication of bad
analogue and status indication more rapidly, clean input data to the Host State
Estimator, more precise data for control staff. reduction of false alarms, There are
many more advantages that affect the Power Application sonware than the SOADA
side.
• cross checked breaker indications
For example, if the ERTU has to send a message that a Breaker has tripped but there
is still power on the line then this fact can be added to the reported initial trip
message.
.. rhe ERTU monitoring ornme based elements
For example, transformer winding temperatures monitored, the ERTU can perform
rate calculations and predict when the transformer protection will operat~ if nothing is
done to relieve the situation, A message indicating potential trip oan be sent to the
Oontrol staff, informing them of the pl"{;blem. This will allow the control staff to the
power system in advance and not wait for tne deVice to trip before doing anything.
• Protection flags can be used to provide additional details of what has tripped and why
For example, applying simple rules using the element data belonging to an electrical
object it is possible to determine the cause of the protection operation. The fautt
diagnostic text message can be ssnt to the Control staff under the information
category of the object,
Additional fault diagnosis algorithms can be used to offer a number of possible
reasons causing the event. When the fault is between substation, both ERTUs send
tl1e list of possible reasons to the host. Ifthe host finds matching suggestions these
can be forwarded to the control staff, In the event of no matching suggestions, this
too, can be used to allow the control staff to examine the offered suggestions and
make deolslons, It is easier. cheaper and more maintainable to set up a Intelligent
System located at the ERTU, that 1nteracts with the Host as and when required, than
it Is to build a complete Expert 8ystem at the Host alone.
The benefrts ot using the CPU power available at the R'rU are substantial and
inexpensive compared to using the Host to supply element data to an Intelligent system,
The complt:.'xity of the ERTU fault diagnostic software does not have to be very involved,
or expensive as the number of inputs available for processing are not that large but the
potential benefits during quiescent and disturbed states are enormous.
8.4 ERTU activities
The ERTU seer,eta!), mode activity involves the normal actions of supporting and
propagating PYI"t1'mid data changes and performing the algorithmic. activities as required.
These involve:
'" category abnormal element counting and time traoklng
• Critical device state message formulation and delivery
• Status and analogue error notification to maintenance staff
43 False alarm detection
'" Power BalanCing and mismatch error reporting
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·~~~~I~Qtlii~.alOlrUe(lt,mode transitions and liep~iitlng,on If)(pi!Gted events not
,I)raa:a.. )
···.fl. 1l1aililteman~1erelated messages to ~tati()n and maintenance ~ff
.,$Ii\eoo aile addiiW>nal.aotivitles that ean he implenlentecl oRce the software has been
.iP$t,llgq, ~.Iil,clde.mf)l(lstrale(i to the .oontrQIstaff.
S.S Host aofivj~i~~
l'h~$e revolve around the MMI needs of the control staff and initially take the fomt of
gl~-nall'a~eaf{Grstation summaries ·ofspeQfficdevice. states, for examp~i '. .'
...... )Jl~ltbe ~isl'i'la¥ta iAdiQate only those devices-with the conditiolls as specified by
!~~ial1pliteria ourrently active.
,5.of sp.eQffic de'lllce types current state
ilO.emts ilil a giVen alarm.state silace a given time.
;~1iIaut;Jibfealarms if a selected number of analogues exceed specific: limits at
..~time.
" AA~ (!J,!'Mate 1TJ(;)tlitoring alarming
.. Reaotln!ll and respon.ding to ERtU secretary results
~~~~,e~,eft$¥$tem $o1tware is introduced,. a large number ot,additional station specific
i;!Qll$ ean be implemented.
'8.~.··~.·~.i}S·,~~~trIl:'.-:i'm; :':"!f~~J'ir.'M'IJ,'~'l,,~':I;
'thIs Qba!\lter deti\tOd the,concept of seQretary i~()de functions using limited versionsl.6f
)n\eJligent systeKjoftware that can be install~d at the ERTU and the hcst. The functions
bare designed to assist the control. staff in o\(erooming the problem otaata overioadlng by
mal<ing use of new technology situated"at the workstation and, the ERTU.
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9•.,·JUStt
ALTERN:
t",·OF THEr$OLUTION AND EVALUATION OF
}
9.1 IntrodactifJliI'
1i!i!I~·iQ~lqPl:ElIexamines the current upgrades taking. place at the ERTUs and examines
if nothing is done to change the 'existing method of data acquisition
display of data.
:~$K0l~ SQAOA .~ystem in its current form has 28 000 element points Installed with
45000 allowed for. With the replacement ofthe 140 RTUs by ERTUS
the 4 years and plans to wire up each device accordil'l.tl to the Teleeontrol
'll:irit1g standard, the number (:)f elements being telemetered and modelled in the SCADA
'~~ta base is going to increase by 71000 elements. The consequences of this action will
,~~11Jeratedenormous problems during a distul'b{ -oe, unless something is done to change .
.fp,e method of data acqulsltlon and display.
Jable 9 lists the number of elements per ~"'"'9ker device for the previous and current
fejeoontroi standards. The table lists tha ief of breakers in each of the different
electrical object types In me ESKOM interCI..iilected power system whioh covers voltagt;ls
from '132 to 765 KV. The combined number of breakers devlces for aUobjects is 2578 •
."
i C Generators Feeder ,Couplers Transformer Shunt
Breakers 121 1069 ~18 869 113
1990 Elements/BKR 1 8 4 6 6
1994 Elements/BKR 3 35 27 39 40
Difference 2 27 23 33 34.. --9614Extra Elements 242 2886 28677 3842
Table 9 Element t!ifferences betw~w :990 and 1994 Telecontrol standarlls
The additional elements ,',;71238. If all ~l1eseadditional elements are implemented, there
will. be a potential increase Of 250% in the data loading of the control staff.
9.3 Installing new elements
Assuming it takes 5 minutes ttl add each of the 71000 new records, it will take nearly 3
man years just to add the data into the ~CADA data base. This excludes time needed for
display building, testing and commissioning. once new records have been added, a data
base update it. required before the new elements can be scanned.
Implementing a standard where the elements of each device are pre-ordered and pre-
defined for identical devices and wired up with presence bits set accordingly, will reduce
the time needed to edd new element significantly.
Generators Fee~er Couplers Transfonver Shunt Series
Capacitor CapaCitor
Breaker Breaker Breaker Breaker Breaker Breaker
Links Links Links Links Links Links
Generator Transformer Reactor Cap
Table 10 List of deVices per electrical object
Accordin(r to the Telecontrol standard, there are eight electrical object types. and a three
station related objects. Each electrical Object consiSts of one or more devices as defined
in Table 10 aFld Table 11. Each device requires its own pre~defined and pre-ordered
element structure. Thus there have to be twelve unique pre-defined sets of element
tables, The~e tables have in-tum to be.,divided into four categories
Ll1lks
8reaker
StaticVAR.
Compensators
Station Security i sent Out
Sent out values
Links
Bus Zone SeCl.lrity
Shunt
R9actor
Series
Reae~ori
: El.teaker Breaker
Links DC suppl,'
Reactor Reactor I VAR. Unit Comms
Table 11 List of devices per electrical pbje~t(continUed)
To aotivate a "new" element in the data base is limited to setting the presence bit to 1 in
the relevant device and ensurlnq that the ERTU commissioning staff have wired the
element to the correct "pre-defined" index. There is no need for data base updates to
commission new elements as the space is already reserved. TIl~ data base staff simply
change tl1e presence flag to active and the element ls in serviCf,t
Totally new devices still require a data base and display update.
Sinc\9 the commissioning of neW elements is carried out on-line the need for large inter
control room planning by data base and RTU,1!?ld staff to synchronise the commiSsioning
of new elements largely faUs away.
(I
9.4 CPl." Loading Consequences
An increase from 20 000 to 71 000 elements may require additional CPU pC.Werif the
existing 2 and·4 second response time is to be maintained.
ThE! proposed solution is based on the current trends in the computing. industry, the
needs of control staff and the demands for additional Information in the control room.
9.4.1 Expecied changes in the computing and electrical industry
The changes in the monitoring and control of the electrical utility industry are expected to
be;
• Host computer power will increase by between 10 and 100 fold in and around the
control room during the next five years.
• Full graphics workstations will be delivered and installed with very superior MMI
facilities in comparison to the classic character graphic display deviceS of the past,
() Power system protection schemes will move towards qigital protection equipment.
This protection equipment will interface directly to the RTU, providing useful additional
data to the control staff, The protection information, linked to expert systems at the
RTU will provide for tt,e rapid understanding of condhlons in title power system during
and following a disturbance,
• Remote terminal Units will be replaced by intelligent versions equipped with increased
computer power.
• The introdUction of wide area networks providing more secure data communications
and wider bandwidths.
• The need for the SCAOA system to provide high value, low priority data outside the
control room, e.g. hoUrly consumer metering data and sequence of event data for
protectlon and fault analysts,
• MUltiple control centres will access the same ERTU at the same time.
_. Phase three protection will provide additionei element data point as indicated in
Appendix 5, which lists the elements for I~ Static Var. Compensator. This Appendix
completely changes the values in Table 11 where only a fraction of the. information is
used •. The consequences ·of adding the additional daia elements will place additional
burdens on the Control staff if the existing methods of display are used.
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This i~,$tle of,ool1(lurrent aesess of the same ~RTU by different uSers causes sev,e,re
maintenanoe problems. Currently when new paints are cOI11fl1isSioned'sttl!le~R"FU~the
diffefenl hosts scanning the 6RTU need to !:is",e their datl:l bases uf)Qate~ at tfle sf,ln1e
time. otherwise there Gould be Q~era"·loss of data until the ERTU an(iJ'the hast are
bro.u.ghtbato line. The proposed s!l)}utiOA'J:).lto\ddes.a possible sOLuUQf;l,toJne 1¥!J:lIt[pleQQ$t
access ptQfule~ by, inoluding maintenance related data bits in,th~ ~RTlhl,lild .the nast
datf\ bases.
Tne aim ofthis paper is the disc.ussion of ways and means to remove or curtail data
overto3(:.liog suffered by the control staff during dlsturbances, In acldition there is also the
need to speed up the time. it takes Jo obtain a clear picture of the current power syst,em
state.
Retaili)ing the existing methods of data storage and OAQ functionality and implementing
the ad~ittonal element data as per the 1994 Teleoontrol standard, the ~tential
con$:equenq~s to be cOtlsidered af(;l; .
\II Massi\1e data overloading of the controls staff during disturbances,
\II Additional data base and display staff will be required to keep up with system growth.
_, Additional communi~tions bandwidth will be required to' cater for the increase in data
acquisition needs. c.
• The ability to access phase three protection indioations will be restricted,
• CPU IQading will have to be increased to sup,?ort the additional MMI activity.
• The {.;traduction of Expert Systems will be delayed and their functionality reduced.
On lhe oUjer hand if the proposed ERTU, communication 'philosophy and MMI deSign is
implemented in conjunction with the 1994 TelecontrQI Standard,. there are, a number of a
advantages;
tl The need fOf large numbers of data base updates is reduced
.. On~Une commissioning of new elements is possible "'" II
• Clearer understanding of the total electrioal state more easily aohieved and in a
shorter time
fJ Expert systems (both central and distributed) can be added at the RTU and the Host
to provide real time asslstance to the control staff.
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10. CONCLUSION
10.1 introduction
This chapter ovaluates the proposed solution and offers a critical review ofthe,report as a
whole. Lastly, the development pl~rffor the implementation of the new MMI philosophy is
considered. '
10.2 Evaluation of the new MMI
F
EQch of tl'Je problem$l.hitially defined in Chapter 1, are re-examined in Table 12, in the
light of the proposed new MMI philosophy.
Problem .
a) iMMsistent significance in
alarm messages.
b) Recurring alarms.
0) Too many alant/s.
a) Alarm overload during a
disturbance.
e) The number of alarms is
sometimes overwi1elming.
Solution
COITected by matching the data on display to the mental
model required by the Control staff. They are no longer at
the mercy of the text in the message but are able to see
what-they-want-when-they-want-to.
Apatt from the three "required" text alarm messages types,
there is very little chance of recurring alarms being sent to
the control staff directly.
Secretary mode functions at the RTU and the Host would
detect them and it would then be up to the malnter.ance
staff to correct the problem at the ERTU.
These problems are no longer relevant if the propose,"!
solution is implemented. The control staff will not have
unwantecLtext_messages sent to them directly. Icons next to
the df'vices-W!!l hldica!e the presence of abnermal states.
As!,uming that this refers to analog alarms, secretary mode
functions CRn be used to ensure that in-context limit :
checking is within bounds to provide some relief. The initial
cause of ine problem is usually the inflexibility of the limits or
the width of the dead band. Simple pattern recognition and
ime of day checking can prevent this.
I-g-'~:---L:-a-c~k-o":"f-a':-ann-s-o-n"_k""'e-y-'---r It appears as if these problems relate to the needs of the
parameters. control staff when attempting to construct a mental model of
h) Need for more Jetailfrom a particular situation. Implementing the 1994 Telecontrol
substations. standard Should correct these problems as well as providing
I) Some etenn messages do not Control staff with the ability to access all the element data
contain enough information. I;:elonging to a device on demand.
j) Some alarm messages
contain too muoh information.
f) Alarm tllreshold too sensitive.
K) Alarm display problems witll
paging.
I) Bottom line ohanges too fast (
this is the current alarm list).
m) Some a/anns are needlessly
repe.ated.
n) ''''11J(tipfemessages are
genercifed for the same
condition.
Apart from the extremely limited number of Breaker text
messages, this problem no longer exists as aU "alarm" data
is visible as icons on the display. However the inherent
problems with any data list still remain, particularly where
new messages are being inserted and deleted on demand.
By implementing the proposed solution the element change
will only be seen ifthe control staff examine the device In full
via a popup window. Secretary mode software would notify
the control staff if something did not happen as expected.
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Table 12 Evaluation of initial problem in terms of the new MM.
From the review of the defined problems, the proposed solution, it is believed, will provide
a solution te- "he data overload problem. Only careful testing under controlled conditions
will provide eoncrete proof of the theories In chapters 6, 7,8 and 9.
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10.3 Concept model MMI
The ideas in this report were used to build a concept model ofthe proposed MMI uSing
Microsoft ACOeSs and demonstrated to control staff and management. The concept
model 'is primitive but does contain enough dynamic behaviour to demonstrate the
viability of the theories.
10.4 Prototype
Based on the concept model, eSKOM management have .Buthorised the development of
a prototype to be used by the control staff under controlled conditions to prove the
functionality of the new philosophy. The prototype will be connected to a power system
simulator to provide disturbance data, will be used to check the precise requirements and
determine the full functionality of all MMI actions and tools.
the ~tot()type will provide a complete environment in which the control staff will have the
opportunity to test all possible network scenarios using controlled network Ilctlvity. The
prototype will also provide the basis for controlled MMI usability engineering studies to
assess performance accurately and for the accurate comparison of the existing and
proposed Man Machine intertaces.
Before the prototype can be developed, a number of areas need attentlon;
• What is the best hardware and-sojtware environment to be used to develop the test
bed?
• Is an object model the best way to represent a power network?
4> How easy Is it to build an object oriented plant and graphical model and get them to
talk tti each other and to the data source?
• How easy will it be to 1ssess the Control staff acceptance and the efficiency of the
new philosophy? .
10.5 Financial consequences
It 15not easy to accurat\~ly estimate the full impact. of ':he proposed solution in financial
terms, However it is important to examine the cost to f:SKOM and the country during a
disturbance, if the existing alarm philo~ophY is retained,
The initial costs are In the design of the new MMI and the Changes to the ERTUs and the
cornrnunication protocol. the cost of ohanging the host data base and adding the
category count changes Is far smaller.
TM inifial estimates of the financial costs are;
10.5.1 ERTU costs
The estimated costs to develop the ERTU to meet the requirements is approximately
R500,OOO an~Hnvolve:
• Derived value code
• Data Sase changes
• ERTU secretary mode functions
• Category counting
• Text message fom:' .Jlation and transmission
10.5.2 Host costs
The estimated cost to develop the changes needed at the host to support the workstation
is approXimately R300,OOO and include:
.. Data Base ohanges
• Category count propagation up the pyramid
• ERTU text message receipt
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10.6.3 Protocol costs
The estimatep. 'costs ~o upgrade the protocol to support to changes needed for the <host
and ERTU communications are appr9ximately R500,OOO and include:
.. Transmission of mixed data messages
• Inclusion of the time stamp dote
.. Text message transmission.
10.5.4 MMI costs
Once the test bed interface has been developed and tested using live data by all the
interested users, it can be used as a living specification for the production version of the
MMI. The estimated costs for its development by a vendor is R 300,000 and assumes
that the prototype software is not reused.
10.6 Responsibilities
once the proposed changes are in place, ESKOM woulq have to ensure that the pre-
ordering of the data elements at the RTU are adhered ti!l in all installations.
Training will have to be provided for the control staff and C" maintenance staff involved
with the operation of the control system.
All existing intelligent ERTUs will have to have changes made to their wiring ~Qd internal
data bases to match the Telecontrol standard. It is possible to phase in the changes
gradually, with a hybrid system ;,) place during the implementation.
10.7 Implementation Plan
Once the prototype has been build and approved by aU potential users, a joint
development team should be set up to plan and install the proposed changes with the
original SCADA equlpment system vendor. The complete project would Hike about 24
months to complete.
Software and hardware staff are required in the following disciplines to assist in the
implementation Or the philosOphy;
• Data Base maintenance
.. Application Software to ensure that SCADA funcnons still operate correctly
• Data Acquisition staff to develop tM RTU end DAQ interfaces at the RTUs and Host.
to Man Machine staff to build the support tools.
e Power Application Software staff investigate and maximise the ERTU options
available to POWer Engineering facilities.
There are a number of additional areas that still need to be investigated;
e The Ilbility of the communications protocol to support the requirements.
• More work nee-is to be done using Simulators and hands on evaluation of the
proposed solution before a full acceptance by manaqems.. •
• It is diffir.ult to do a full cost benefit analysis as there are stili a number of ullkllowns.
• No work has been done on the Impact on any of the POWer Application Software such
as Contingency Analysis, Short Circuit Analysis or State Estimation. These modules
may need changes to benefit from the ERTU secretary mode options.
10,8 Critical ReView Of This Report
While it Is believed that the proposals outlinel1ln this report are, in general new and
untried, they should meet what Is considered a critir.al and growing problem facing not
only ESKOM, but all major Utilities. It is, however, conceded that the proposed solution is
unlikely make the work Of control staff easier during quiesc.ent network conditions. In
addition the methods of monitoring the power system state in the control room will need
to be examined to see if changes must be made to bater for the proposed display of
abnc.mal element indications.
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However, the enthusiasm demonstrated by the 'eontn,1 sto;i,ffduring the demonstrations .of
the concept models indicate that they are more than ready for the otfersd lunctlonallty.
They are also more than ready to suggest ways and means to improve the fQcilitt~s that ".
ttley badly need. ."
One of the foreseeable problem areas Will be control staff reliance on the ERTU
aqgorithms to advise them of problems at the sl!bstation.lo th~ evellt that the algorithmic
output i~4ncon'ect, the control $taffwill blame the new philosophy., The prototype whl
have to be used to evaluated 1hese ~rgorithms in more detail with the intention of making
them more robust and testing the built-in self diagnostic functions.
The following sections highlight specifiC areas of concern.
1.0.8.1 '.!leotalmodels
The concept of a m~mta[ model is still open to debat~ as there is no unanimity as to what
a mental model is or how it is formed. To quote from staggers and Norolo [19] "Mental
models are created by the users as they interact with the target system images and may
not be equiI!',llent to the conceptual models. These are what people really have in there
heads to guide their use ofthings.u
The mental models used in the study are stili very much based on group discussions and
not on exhaustive studies of the individual Control staff members. More work is
necessary, as the tools to determine whai constitutes an accurate model of a physical
system, are not av::;;ilable at present.
10.8.2 Newknowledge
01. cemptencn ofthe prototype, the metrtcs used to evaluate the Control staff behaviour
will be availab!e for use in other dir i.,Unes usfnpJ'.na~~trial Man Machlf\e Interfaces.
10.8.3 Support
Staff from a nUll ' sr of disciplines in ESKOM hfl.rJ:& =en r;;xpOr~~pto the$~ Ideas and
hav~ weloomed them. There are many areas th!~lneed addlt!f)na3 work, .especially in the
areaJ~f nOh-standard element. O'Jclsions wil~b~)\need'idon t~e best methods of grouping
the elements and s.;.Jecting the category that the. t Sll,lUld balUn!) to.
More details could by required in the area of MMI secretary mode tools, however as this
is still a concept, more time is needed to develop the functionality.
10.8.4 Academic view
From-an academic point of view, the suggestions In this report add to the wea!th of
comments on MMI in general, but do provide useful Input from a practicel point of view,
based on first hand experience of MMI design. From an Industrial aspect, they offer a
possible solution that could be lmplemented in similar disciplInes such as oil refining.
ships, alrcraft",mlning and steel mills, to name a few.
Once implemented, there will also be £i major change in (he role of th'a Man Ma.chine
Interface as it will be able to respond to a wider range Of user dem~ud5 to meet the
nelwork changes.
If the id~as are lrnptemented, there will be serious de ;opments in IISecr~rtar;,mode"
tools to satisfy the heeds of the control staff Md pr~\ection engineers. these
developments will offer many opportunities for the usa of Expert and Intelligent Systeus.
10.8.S Advantages
The benef:s of irn0lementing the proposed Sf ;icn are:
ill Reducth,>~ of control staff stress d'~ring a disturbance.
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.. Control staff have more' control (iver the data they need rather thati being at the mercy
of the SCADA system.
• Development and introduction of ,low cost "value added software" at the RTU and Host
as an aiternative to the very expensive centralised expert systems •
. « Reduction in data base. and display maintenance time.
ii, enhanced matching of the mental models used by the control stafflo the phys;osl
system.
'" Very rapid visualisation of the power system state becomes possible.
.. i3etter,})se of the fun graphic workstations. .
• Provide live data Via standard one-line displays users outside the control room.
Moving the responsibilily for the accuracv of tile SCADAdata to the R.TU.,will speed up
the ability of the t,' ,infenance staff to correct problems in the field. Since fl1e"Vhecking or
ppw~r balancing software c::m,be R'lked to tne substation bay computers. Accuracy
checks. cart be run "off-line" ~dh results available to the RTU commissioning staff
independently otthe State Estimation software at the Host, which lip until now was the
only way Qf completelyccheckil1g the analog values in a station.
iO.8.6 Oi~advantages
The main disadvantage of these suggestions are the number of changes needed to th~ .
existing faCilities. specifically the. Host data base, the ERTU software anu lha .....
communications protocol. However, there does not appear to be any other alternative
available.
10.9 Conclusions
After examining the problems and the benefits offered by the proposed solution, the
highlights of the philosophy are;
• Control staff are not subjected to large volumes of unsolicited data.
• Elementdata belongs to the device and hence to the object.
All data for a given device or object can be viewed in the same time context.
o Control staff obtain an instantaneous feel for the system and the element state in
question from a single window, uncluttered by unwanted dala.
o Icons displayed next to 3 device indicate the existence of one or more child elements
in the abnormal state.
• Staff using the new MMI determine the level of abstraction that they use to view the
network data and control the data is displayed on th~ one-line displays.
• Cross reterenoes of individual device states are Indlbated by Object and Device Ty~,
nllowing the control staff to rapidly find information related to the problem they are
working on.
• Control staff no longer have to wade through pages of teXl: lists to "see" what the
current state orthe power network is.
It is belie~ sd that. it is important to build a prototype MMI and test the proposed solution
using live data and demonstrate the results to control staff and management Only then
will it be possible to g~t support to finance the instalration of these ideas.
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APPENDIX 1 ..COpy t')F THE ALARM LOG
Appendix 1 Example of ESKOM disturbance log
lntroducticn
Example of an event on the ESKOM network which generated 431 of alarms in 10
minutes, with 79 in the first 30 seconds. There was a BUStONE operation at TUTUKA,
caused by the opening of the Tutuka_Majuba KV line links under (oad conditions. This
caused the loss of 1155 MW of generation and 179 MW load by under frequency load
shedding. The frequency dropped from 50.00 Hz to 48.88 Hz which triggered automatic
load shedding and returned to normal 4 mlnuteslater,
15:21:45 *4 KRONOS 40t)CPLRA BKR CLOSE
15:21:51 *5 UMFOLOZI NORRX1 EKR TRIP CONTROL SUCCESS
15:21:47 *4 UMFOLOZI NORRX1 BKR TRIP
15:21:48 *5 MERSEY 1/27$B- KV 281 NOIDR..AL
15:22:23 *6 KRONOS 400CPt,RA GROU1 NORMAL
15:23:16 *6 TRIDENT RUSCM GROUP1 NORMAL
15:23:20 *4 VERWOERDBURG VERWR 'J'HIP_ ALRH ALARM
15:23:27 *4 'l'UTUKA MAJUB1 ERR TRIP-15:23:27 *4 TUTUKA UNIT2 400 BKR TRIP
15:23:27 *4 TUTUKA UNIT3 22 BRR TRIP
15:23:27 *4 TUTUKA 1/400SEC1:=BKR TRIP
15:23:27 *4 TUTUKA 1!400SEC2_BKR TRIP
15:23,:27 *4 TUTUKA UNIT6 22 BKR TRIP
15:23:29 *5 MERSEY 1/275B KV 280 278 LOW
15:23:29 *5 TUTUKA UNIT 3 KV 19 0 1.0'1'7
15:23:29 *5 TUTUKA UNIT 6 KV 19 0 LOW
15:23:31 *4 MAJUBA TGTUK1 BRR TRIP
15:23:32 *5 LETHABO 2/275-1 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:32 *5 LETHABO l/275-1 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:32 *s LETHA130 1/275'",6 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:32 'k5 LETHABO 2/275-4 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:32 *5 APOLLO 2/400 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:32 *5 PALMIET 1/400 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:32 *5 GRASSRIDGE 1/132 RV 135 134 LOW
15:23:32 *4 TUTUKA MAJUB1 MOLT" OPEN
15:23:32 *4 TUTUKA UNIT6 22 MAL OPEN
15:23:32 *4 TUTUKA UNIT3 22 MAL OPEN
15:23:32 *4 TUTUKA UN!'l'2400 MAL OPEN
15:23:32 *6 TUTUKA UNIT2 ISLAT'WEALRM ALARM_
15:23:32 *6 TU'1'UI<A UNIT 5 ON OFF ON
15:23:32 *6 TUTUKA UNIT 1 ON OFF OFF
15:23:32 *6 TUTUKA UNIT 2 ON OFF OFF-15:23:32 *6 TUTUKA UNIT 3 ON OFF OFF
15:23:32 *6 TUTUKA UNIT 6 ON OFF OFF
15:23:32 *5 TUTUKA BATTERY COMMO ALARM-15:23:33 *5 POSEIDON 1/400 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *5 DUVHA 1/400N HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *s MATLA 1/400N HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *5 HIGHVELD 1/2758 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *5 ARNOT 1/400N HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *5 ,l\RNOT 1/275 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *5 GROOTVLEI 1/400N HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *5 HENDRINA 1/400N HZ 49 48 LOW
15:23:33 *5 MULDERSVLEI SYNCH3 MVAR 72 82 HIGH
15:23:33 *5 MUI.l)ERSVI,EI 1/400 KV 380 375 LOW
15:23!33 *s ~.mLDERSVLEI 2/400 KV 380 379 LOW
15:23:33 *5 DRAKEN'SBERG 1/400 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23:33 *5 SALT RIVER Y/33 HZ 49 49 LOW
15:23;34 *4 TRIDENT RUSCM BRR CLOSE
15:23:35 *4 MAJUBA TUTUI<l BKR CLOSE
15:23:35 *5 KENDAL 2/400-'1 HZ 49 49 LOW
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15:23:35
15:23:39
15;23:39
15:23:41
1.5:23:42
15:23:42
15:23:42
15:23:42
15:23:42
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*5 KRIEL
*5 KOEBERG
*5 DRAKENSBERG
*4 HYDRA
*4 APOLLO CNVR'1'
*5 ACACIA
*5 ACACIA
*4 AVON
*4 AVON
*5 M.D.JUBA
-I-. .•j; !'1AJUBA
*s AVON
*5 AVON
*5 MAJUBA
*5 PORT REX
*5 PORT REX
*5 POR1'REX
*6 APOLLO CNVRT
*5 ALPHA
*5 AURORA
*4 KRONOS
*4 HYDRA
*6 CROYDON
*4 KOMATIPOORT
*4 ARIES
*5 MERSEY
*5 MULDl'lRSVLEI
*5 MULDERSVLEI
*5 MULDERSVLEI
*9 HYDRA
*6 MAJUBA
*5 AVON
*5 AVON
*5 BOUNDARY
*5 THESEUS
*6 KRIEL
*4 IMPALA
*4 IMPALA.
*6 IMPALA
*5 VD K1.00F
*4 HYDRA
UNIT 1
UNIT_2
tlNIT 3
FILTR2 GRotJP2
BATTERY COMMO
1/400
PER~URBOORAl?H
SVC2 CX3 BI{R
TRFR 3 GROUP1
INFLN EKR
PERTURBOGRAPH
1/275B
SYNCH3
1/400
2/400
SVC2 CX3 BKR NOP
'I'UTUK1BKR
CARRIER UPS FIt.
BA'I'TERYLOW VLTAGE
CARRI.ER UPS FlL
TR_3. TAP
UNIT_2 ON OFF
1/400N
1/40013
G/M_3
svcz CX3 BI{R
FILTR2 EKR
1/400 -
1/132
UMGEN1 BKR
UMGEN2 BRR
STANG2 BRR
STANGl BRR
2/400-'1
1/400-1
TUTUK1 BKR
CARRIER UPS FIL
BATTERY LOW VLTAGE
BATTERY COMMO
PONGli BKR,'_
HILLV BKR
HZ 49 49
HZ 49 49
HZ 49 49
HZ '4:9 49
HZ 49 49
KV 420 425
KV 420 425
SIR/INIT_RESET
HZ
HZ
HZ
49 49
49 49
;1.9 49
49 49
15:23:42 (,'4 AVON
15:23~42 *4 AVON
15:23:42 *5 MAJrTBA
15:23:42
15:23:42
15:23:42
15:23:42
15:23:43
15:23:43
15:23:43
15:23:43
15:23:44
15·...3:44
15:'23:45
15:23:45
15:23:45
15:23:47
15:23:47
15:23:4B
15:23:49
15:23:53
15:23:53
15:23:53
15:23:58
15:24:02
15:24:03
15:24:03
15:24:11
15:24:13
15:24:24
15:24~29
15:24:29
15:24:29
15:24:33
15:24:31
15:24:32
15:24:32
15:24:32
15:24:31
15:24:31
15:24:31
15:24:33
15:24:45
15:24:46
15:24:43
15:24:43
HZ
KV 282
MVAR 20
KV 393
KV 396
SIR/INIT_RESET
1
HILLV GROTJP1
GEN/CONP_STAR ••••1 GEN
TR_2_400_MAL2
*5 VERWOEhO~TJRG 220V_SUPPLY_FIL
*4 VERWOERDBURG VERWR_'l'RIP__ALRM
*5 VERWOEROBURG 220V_STJl?PLY_FIL
*4 MULOERSVLEI TR_4__66_BKR
*4 MULDERSVLEI TR_5__ 66_BKR
*6 MU.tDERSVLEI
*5 THESEUS
*5 VD KLOOF
*5 HF VERWOERD
*6 VD KLOOF
*6 VO KLOOF
TRFR_B_GROUP2
CONTROL
TR 3 'rAP
GEN/COND S~AR 2 GEN
GEN/COND:STAR: •••1 GEN
BRAKES .•••••••.••10N_OFF
INITIATE SHUTOWN.I0N OFF- _
3
CONTROL
CON~ROL
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o
LOW
LOW
LOW
CLOSE
TRIP
LOW
LOW
~RIP
TRll?
TRIP
TRIP
HIGH
HIGH
INITD
ALARM
ALARM
ALARM
LOW
LOW
LQtll
ALARM
ALARM.
LOW
A N 1i.
TRIP
NORMAL
TRIP
A_N~A
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
ALARM
RESET
NORl4AL
NORMAL
NORMAL
LOW
OFF
TRIP
TRIP
ALARM
SUCCESS
CLOSE
NORMAL
NORMAL
ALARM
TRIP
TRIP
ALARM
NORMAL
SUCCESS
SUCCESS
OFF
ON
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1.0 PLTRPOSE
OPS5026l22-5
to tpecify the EMS telecontrol requirements for both Transrnission Operations arid Distribution
at all M.t.S. stations.
2.0 SCOPE
Telecontrol functions at alt new M.T.S. stations are to be implemented in accordance with this
document.
The functions in this docum; nt are required only if they exist e.g, a carrier a9~(ijjn:Jlalarm is
not required unless it exists for the particu~r panel concerned. '
, '-, ...·r~)/
NOn; :1tems have been added to this dMument to indicate future requirements (as foreseen)
so that the necessary telemetry can be in place when required.
3.0 REFERENCES
OPS 50 Hl/22~5
OPS 500 1/22~5
OPS 5016/22~5
OPS 5015122~5
Standard defining terminology relating to the direction cf'power flow.
Standard relating to AGe power supplies.
Standard relating to Interlocking,
Standard relating to Power Station Speed Governing
Durban Distributor Telecontrol Requirements
Cape Distributor Telecontrol Requirements
Johannesburg Distributor Telecontrol Requirements
Cape Distributor (East) Telecontrol Standard
4.(. .DEFINITIONS
Power Stations
Special Power Stations
All coal fired power stations.
.All power stations which can be operated remotely by supervisory
'control while unattended and new power . stations which are not
intended fOT Automatic Generation Control (AGC) operation.
Currently these stations ate the hydro, gas turbine and nuclear
(Koeberg) stations.
All IPS stations without generationDistribution Stations
Abbreviations used in this document.
AGC
ARCAVR
ECS
EMS
EMSCPEOD
ER'fUleS
IDF
IPS
IRBIIRP
IReLPU
MTSNee
RLO
RTl1
SF6
SIR
SSBueDUPS
Automatic Generation Control
Auto Re-Close
Automatic Voltage Regulator.
Energy Control System Sectiorrat System Operations, Sirnmerpan,
Energy Management System computer located at NCC, Simmerpan,
Energy Management System Control Panel.
Electrical Operators Desk.
Bnhanced Remote Terminal Unit.
Integrated Control System. •
Intermediate Distribution Frame. This is the interface between the R'rU and
station telecontrol functions or telemetering.
Interconnected Power System
Interposing Relay Board/Panel
Interposing Relay Connector
Line Protection Unit
Main Transmission System
National Control Centre,
Reset Lock Out
Remote Terminal Unit.
Sulphur Hexaflouride
Synchronise Initiating Relay
Single SideBand
Unit Control Desk.
Uninterruptible PowerSupply,
C EMS TELECONTROL REnUIREMENTS
5.0 RESl>ONSIBILITIES
OPS5026/22-5.. DEC 1994 3/26~.-~----~------.----~
Engineering, Transmission PTM and Distribution Maintenance departments shall ensure that
the requirements of this standard are complied with at all new Power and Distribution Stations.
\.,
Transmission Operations shall specify telecontrol requirements for special Power Stations on an
individual basts; 1S telecontrol facilities depend on station design.
"'~
A1 existing' stations where improved telecontrol is essential, it may be necessary to provide
functions not existing presently at the station concerned. Some new stations will require
facilities not specified in this document. Special requests will be made by Transmission
Operations or the Distributor in such cases.
All non-demarcated IPS equipment, i.e, equipment within Transmission boundaries, will be
managed and controlled by facilities at the National Control Centre (NCC) and Standby
National Control Centre (STABNAC).
Where Distribution facilities are non-existent, transmission Operations will attempt to
aCicommodate supervisory control for non-Il'S equipment at IPS stations in the Distribution
area.
Where.Distribution and Transmit ,.lionshare an ERTU, any operation on or changes to the ERTU
must be done in accordance with the respective Standards documents and with the r' tsent of
both parties. When the ERTU is in a lvITS station, all operations on and changes to 4•..:ERTU
must be authorised by System Operations.
6.0 ACTIONS
6.1" Standards
.~i-'
Wiring standards shall comply with the requirements of Section 9 (Telecontrol Wiring
Requirements). Megawatt and Megavar direction of flow shall comply with ESKOM Standard
OPS 5010!?2-5
6.2 Alarm grouping
In IPS stations where an ERTU is installed, alarm grouping if required will be carried out by
software in the BRTU. There will be no hardwired commonlng of alarms in the IDF. The
groupings, GROUP 1, GROUP2, and SECONDARY PROtECTION, will be maintained as
software groupings in the same form as when they were hardwired.
6.3 Timetag data.
Time tagging must be implemented at all IPS stations where an ERTU is installed. The points
to be marked will be specified by System Operations. These points will be defined in the ERTU
at configuration time.
6.4 Telemetry Indication (Status) State Conventions.
Section 8,0 specifies the recommended normal "States" of Telemetered Indications/Alarms for
CONITEL RTUs. The convention is that a State 0, at. closed contact, indicates the desired
condition.
Section 8.1 refers to the ERTU and the convention for double bit indications when used with the
ERTU.
This table should be adhered to when RTU maintenance and EMS databaee-engineering staff
respectively commission and define newstatlons.
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7.1 GENERATORS
AT
'COAL FIRED POWER STATIONS
CONTROLS
ANALOGS
BREAKER INDICATIONS
LINK INDICATIONS
A.G.C. INDICATIONS ,
GJuly, 1995 Appendix 2 Telecontrol Standard 4
I...--E_'M~S~T.,....E_L_EC_O_N_T_R_O_L_R_E_Q'C"U_IR_E_M_E~N_TS__ O_P_.S_5_O_26_/2_2_-5 DEC 1~14 5/26 ~ I
7.2 GENERATORS
AT
HYDRO, PUMP STORAGE AND GAS TL\Q.BINE STATIONS
CONTROLS
ANALOGS
BREAKER & DEVICE ThlJJICATIONS
5 July. 1995 Appendix 2 Telecontrol Standard 5
r EMS TELECONTROL R.EQUIREMENTS QPS5026/22-5 DEC 1994 6/26 ..J
7.3 FEEDERS
CONTROLS
ANALOGS
INDICATIONS
5 JUly, 1995 Appendix.a Telecontrol Standatd 6
[EMS 1§LECON"TROL REQUIREMENlS OPS5026/22-5
\ . . .. "
7.3 FEEDERS
DEC.1994 t12iL]
BREAKER & DEVICE INDICATIONS (continued)
LINK INDICATIONS
GENERAL
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EMS TEl.ECONTROL RE;QUIREMENTS OPS5026/22 ..5
.. .••..•. ..••... r '(I"""'". ...........,
DEC 1994~13f26
7.4 BUS COUPLER AND SEC'EIONITRANSFERBREAKERS
CONTROLS
BUS COUPLER & SECTIONITRANSFER BREAKER INDICATIONS
IiJuly. 199!i Appendix 2 Telecontrol Standard
EMS TELECONTROL REQUIREMENTS OPS5026122-5 "DEC 1994 9/26
7,,5 TRANSFORl\1ERS
CONTROLS
ANALOGS
BREAKER INDICATIONS
S July, 1995 Appendix 2 Telecolltrol Stand;ud 9
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7.5 TRANSFORMERS
nmAKER INDICAT]:ONS (continued)
Ln~K INDICATIONS
TRANSFORMER DEVICE INDICATIONS
TAP CHANGER INDICATIONS
5 July, 1995 Appendix 2 Telecontrol Standard 10
EMST~L
- ,"0 _ . "'_' __ '.
, DEC 1994 11t!2.6
CONTROLS
F.EAI(ER INDICATIONS
5. July, 1995 Appent\~l(2 'Telecon(rol St"n<tal'd
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~.6 SIItJNT REACTORS
BR11-:AKERlNDICATIONS (continued)
.LINK INDICATIONS
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7.7 SHUl'TT CAPACITORS
CONTROLS
ANALOGS
BREAKER JNDICATIONS
LINK INDICATIONS
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7.8 SERIES CAPACITORS
CONTROLS
ANALOGS
BREAKER,INDICATIONS
LINK lNDICATIONS
5 July, 1996 Appendix 2 Te!(!(:otltrol Standard 14
EMS TELEGONTROL REQUIREMENTS OPS5026/22-5 II DEC 1994 '15/26J
7.9 STATIC VOLTAGE; COMPENSATORS
CONTROLS
INDICATIONS
Ii
ANALOGS
5 JuIV, 1995 Appe!ldh< 2 Telecontrol Standard
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[}MS TELECONTROLREQUH'{EMENTS,., OPS50Z€3t22-o
7.10 "STATION LEVEL
BUS ZONE INDICATIONS
AUXILIARY SUPPLY INDICATlONS
GENERAL INDICATIONS
6 July, 1996 Appendix 2 T~letontt()1 Standard 1("
ISMSl'~LeC'()W"'ROLRIt.Q{lliREMENTS OPS5026/22w5
7.10 ,STATlONLEVEL
J1SC 1GJ94.•••1712(J
cOM1\roNICATIONS CONTROLS
COMMUNICATIONS INDICATIONS
WEATHER INDICATIONS
Ii JUly, 199$ Appendix 2 Telecol1trol Stal1dard 17
[E!J18 TELECONTROLREQU!.l~~MENTS OPS5026/22-5
7.11 SECURITY
DEC 1994 1'8/26
,,f"')
CONTROLS
INDICATIONS'
7.12 INTEGRATED VAI.lUES
SENt OUTS PERGENERATOR ANDPER TRANSMISSION L~
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8.0 AL,ARM STATE CONVENTION
CONITEL RTUs
In the table below, STATE "0" indicates the normal state for devices and, indications, and the alarm
state for ALARMS. The CONTACTS column gives the state of the contacts When this state is selected.
The convention is that a closed contact indicates the desired state,
See Section 8.1 for ERTU and double bit indications.
CONTACTS CLOSE FOR ALARM CONDITION
CONTACTS OPEN FOR BREAKER/LINK OPEN CONDITION
5 July, 1995 Appendix 2 Telecontro! Stalld~rd
.,.,......---~_,. .........~ .... ~,._.;'~......,
EMS TELEGONTROL REQUIREM(NTS QPS5026/~2-5 DEC 19~i~,20/26------~----.--~--------~--~----~~.--~~
S.l ALARM STATE CONVEN'TION FOR ERTUs
III the case oftll? ER"ru, the indication is the inverse of the CONITEL RTU. Column 4 of Sect" ••
8.0 gives the relMant contact states for devices and indications on CONITEt RTUs, when applied to the
ERTU, the STATE "0" and STATE "1" referenc(;ls ml~~tbe reversed.
DOUBLE BIT INDICATION CONVENTION
In the case of doliblb·Jit indications, the following conventions should be followed.
The qvo bits in tl)e table below.will be referred to as the X and th~)e~~it,where the X bit i~the Most
Significant Bit and the S bit is the Least Significant Bi.t. .
STATE TABLl~
INDICATION CONVENTION
5 July, 1995 Appendix 2 Telecontrol Standard 20
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9.0 l'EI.JECONTROLWIRING-REQUIREMENTS
9.1 SCOPE
Telecontrol wiring is the electrical connection of the telecontrol functions between originating contacts
or supervisory relay coils, supervisory interposing panels and the IDF or bay input/output units (IO
Unit) located within or in close proximity to plant control, protection and alarm panel equipment.
9.1.1 There shall be no station-level-interlocking on NeC or STA.BNAC EMS control facilities by
Integrated Control System (ICS) equipment. Interlocking shall comply with ESKOM Standard
OPS 5016/22w5.
9.1.2 TIle telecontrol functions are designated thus
ltd
"~A"
"S"
"T"
"A"
"U"
Commands OrControls
Fleeting Ormomentary change detect indications
Status or alarm indications .
BCD tap position indications
Analog telemetering quantities
Energy Counters. Units of power imported/exported in terms ofMW or MVar per hour.
9.1.3 "C" The relay!~oil i"momentarily operated (SOwlOOOms)from the Master Station via the RTU's
own 50 volt DC power supply or plant Control-panel power t.applies. Thus the coil should be
totally isolated on both sides and potentia! free. Each trip and close coil must be wired out to
the JDF or bay 10 Unit on a twisted pair of tei:llphone type cable. AllY spring rewind must be
automatic 'i;'
):
9.1.4 "M", "S" or "TI' are binary input indication,~ or alarms from conditions at the station for
transmission via the RID to the Master$tattei{. These indications must be provided in the form
of normally open contacts, which close when the breaker/isolator is closed, or dose when an
alarm has been activited e.g, a closed contact, referred to in Section 8.0 as State 0, indicates the
desired signal for the CONlTEL RTU. This will be a State 1 for the ERTU. Each individually
referenced alarm or status: is to be wired-out on an individual twisted pair of telephone type
cable to the JDF Or bay IO units. In power stations it will be necessary to use screened type
cable to eliminate noise. In no case is there to be any commoning of individually referenced
status or alarms. All contacts must be potential free and able to tolerate SOVDC interrogation.
Indications are currently only required to be single bit, but where double bit indications are
available both should be wired in.
9.1.5 'W' Analog or Telemetering. The connection between the transducer and the IDF or bay 10
Units must be on a twisted pair of screened telephone.type cable. All analogs to be 0 w5ma or 0
.. 201l1~signal range. New stations will be standardised as 0 - Sma.
9.1.6 "U" Energy Counters. This function must be provided on a potential free, Form "C" type
change-over contact. It is essential that the relay coil operating the potential free contact is
DC driven with surge suppression. Jf llfe originatmg contact is connected to an AC supply
then the share relay must he modiried, using a bridge rectifier, for DC operation and with
surge suppresion, Where a CON1TEL RTU is installed the output pulse rate must not exceed
4096 pulses per hour, this restriction does not apply to the ERTU.
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10.0 AU'r,~),MATIC GENERATION CONTROL REQUIREME~TS
ThISsection gives afunctional outline of AGC requirements and soine details of the equipment to
be. provided together. with specific . functions. Before proceeding with the Interface . design for
connecting the AGe to the turbine units, please refer to drawing 0.64/134971, contained on page 26 of
this document, This drawing shows all the signals. currently required by System Operations for AGe.
The general outline of the modifications that have been made to more recent Power Stations are shown
in this diagram. Further information can be obtained from System Operations and/or the EMS co~
ordinator at Simmerpan.
This section should be read in conjunction with the ESKOM Standard on Power Station Speed
Governing (OPS 5015/22-5.Rev. 1)
The Setpoint Megawatts analog. specified in the Analog table of Section7.1 and Section 7.2 must be
provided for all stations that ate required to be on A.G.C. to enable setpoint control to be performed;
The following nomenclature is used in this schedule>
AGC is. Automatic Generation .Control as carried out by the National EMS facilities, a'~National
Control, Simmerpan,
EMS AGC. CONTROLLER is a self-contained unit control system at the station that communicates
with the EMS computer via the EMS Remote Terminal Unit at the station and forms part of the
EMS equipment adjacent to the RTU in the Comrnunication and Metering room.
EMS CP - EMS Control Panel (provided as part of the EMS equipment) located on the EOD in the
main control room or unit control room.
RTU EMS Remote Tcniilnal Unit at the station (provided as part of the EMS ~quipment)
located in the CQmmurti~\ationand Me~f}ringroom. (', .
UCP Unit (turbine-generator) Control Panel, Orrelay panel, located in the rela)'va.ul("room.
UCD Unit Control Desk, located in the Unit Control Room,
10.1 FUNCTIONS TO BE PROVIDED BY POWER STATION DESIGN
10.1.1 SuPERVISORY ISOLATION SWITCH
As the National EMS is part of the Supervisory function, it is necessary that .each UeD (Unit
Control Desk) be provided with a supervisory isolation switch. The switch must provide
isolation of the EMS AGC controller raise and lower signals from the load controller or turbo-
generator control equipment, When the switch is "ON" the unit is available for EMS control.
When "OFF" the unit is not available and the external trip circuit must be open. See drawing
0.64 113497. '~
\
10.1.2 SUPERVISORYINDICATIONL~S ,
Two indication lamps of different cOlour~l as per Power staton Stand.-"\1:dsare required at the
ueD. ' '
Governor Control-AGC ':liffiD" (preferably).
Governor Control-Uf'P ltGREEN" (preferably).
See drawing 0.64 1I34Q7
At the UCD, the suggested location is adjacent to the existing load dispatch ON/OFF
indications.
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10.1.3 ANALOG INDICATIONS
OPS5026/22-5 DEC 1994 23/2fL J
GEl\r.ERATORMEGAWATTS
An analog indication (preferably 0 - SmA transducers, 0 - 20tnA are acceptable) of generator
megawatts is required. The signal must be provided over II twiste¢ pair to the IDF.
SET POINT MEGAWATTS
An analog indication (preferably 0 - 5mA, 0 - tOlnA acceptable) of generator set-point
megawatts is required, This signal must be provided over a twisted parr.
HIGHILOW REGULATING LIMIT
An analog. indication (preferably 0 - SmA, 0 ...20tnA acceptable) of maximum and minimum
permissible MW's for c(~ntroIof tile machine i~required if available and applicable.
\\u
10.1A .DESIGN CONSD1~ERATIONS
Ii
CONVERSION CONS~JwrS
At au early stage in the design work, the conversion constants of the transducer output milliamps
against megawatts are required to enable the correct scaling resistors to be ordered.
NATIONAL EMS liON/OFF" CONTROL
Potential free change-over contacts within the AGe controller give an indication to the station
that AGC is "OFF" Or "OW. It is operated by push buttons on the EMS Control Panel, If power
is removed from the AGe controller, the contact will fail over to the "OFF" position. See
drawing' 0.64 113497 ."
The supervisory Isolgtion switch on the UCD shoqld isolate the AGC controller raise/lower
function connections'irom the load controller or the \'urbo-generator control equipment, towards
the (heavy current) MDF. See drawing 0.64 113497.
NOTE: .
The AGC controller can only be selected to "AGC ON" if external trip is not activated (i.e,
machine healthy), and supervisory isolation switched to "ON", (Contacts on this switch are in
series with EXT TRIP).
RAISEILOWER CONTROL INPUTS
A raise and lower control input connection is required, by means of which the turbine governor
set point (or target load) setting can be increased or decreased by the Natio ,J EMS AGe
controller. This control k;mt connection could be connected to the same coinrol input used
by power station operator to effect load changes. It shall not be possible, however to
simultaneously perform control from both Nat. EMS and the UCP or Mimic.. Since the EMS
will make regular and precise load changes it .3 essential that no intermediate contactors OJ:
relays be present between the AGC controller output and the governor set point control circuits.
Otherwise this will result in distortion of; and delay of, control pulses from the Ace
contioher, However, control of the turbine unit at the unit can be affected in the normal way.
When the unit is controlled in this manner, a "set point" operated contact, to be provided, opens
and effects external trip to the EMS AGe software.
In the Case of governor control bear with selectable ramp rates, the maximum or another pre-
defined ramp rate shall be automatically selected when the unit is selected to AGe. This is
necessary because the AGe control system tuning will be based on the set ramp rate. There is
no danger that AGC will cause the unit to exceed the maximum permissible ramp rate due to
extensive ramp rate protection provided ill the computer as well as the AGe controller of
the individual generating units.
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10.1.4 l\)~~(lN C'®~SIDBRATIONS (continued)
c.
EX1ERWAi;~FONcTrON
'1'h(l~tl'(pi;~$\:!~Qf~!>':lilllcttonis to allow the station to regain control of the maohine in ita. event
o . ;of;the tnaohine. The trip will be caused by an aonofmru. condition(.lU the
.\~fM5~.l!.t'.•the turbil1e driver openlted the llmt, or It unit oapability restriqtion
thlil. AGe controller to trip itself'(i.e, change from AGe "ON" to HOFF").this
metered to the National EMS computer, by the Natioual EMS RTU.
series normally closed contacts are to be operated by t~e~ise and lower
..~1il mimic to iuitiate a trip." Generator islanding should also inn"~tethis trip.
r')11tocK • ro}ISE AND LOWER
{"k'~>' .,'}
fils for future use, where it may be necessary to temporarily inhibit the AGC·
~M'Clrpulsing, whilst other SI'll;POIloperations are in progress.
~~!l;l~~;i,l!UlMg~!lerated program allow~ th~ power station operator to rai$e or lower. the machine
QU~uttot4e limits set on the EMS Contil~l Panel.Use oHhis function is telemetered to the Nat. EMS
~p.mt:iutef:;;,.The :srvrs Control Panel push button ON/OFF mnst be "OFF" before a local raise or lower
tu:tQgram is i¢IiElted,ltowever When'ihe local raise or lower programjs initiated, for the duration
orpulses, flit indication is sent to tbe UCJ.)that AGe is liON",
~.\
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11.0 :POWERREQUIREMENTS
n.r RTUIERTU AND RELATED EQuIPMENT
OP85026/22~5
,"""'"
DEC 1994· 25/26 . {I
:the .National EMS Remote Tenninal Unit (RTU) together with the EMS Automatic Generation
Control System (AGC controller) and EMS Control Panel (EMS CP) require three (3) separately fed
50 volt DC power supplies derived from a battery and charger system which can maintain supplies for
a minimum period of 8 hours at the following rates:
New RTU installations will be supplied with ii'll ERTU which requires a supply as shown below
1 CONlTEL: "Cleantl SOVDC 6 amps, S hours)
) e.g. 150 AlII
ERTU : "Clean" SOVDC 10 amps, 8 hours)
2. "Cloan" .sOVDC 9 amps, 8 hours;
3. IIDhty" 50VDC Jamps, 8 hours;
The "fall of" voltage should llot be less than 35 volts at the end of the 8 hour period. It follows that 1& .2
can be from tIle same system.
S~~ply No.1 powers the RTU logic and modems.
Supply No.2 powers tIle AGC logtc.
Supply No.3 powers the optical isolating equipment used to transmit indications from the H.V. yard.
The above requirements are laid down in OPS 5001l22~5.
The ERTU can be supplied with a number of different input voltages as indicated below
1. 110VDC SA
2. 220V AC 2.SA
3 220V DC 2,5A
11.2 TRANSDUCERS
The measurement transducers must be fed by power supplies derived from a battery and oharger .
system WIlictt can maintain supplies for a minimum period of 8 hours.
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APPENDIX 3 ..CONTROL STAFF TASK ANALYSIS
Appendix 3 National Control staff Task analysis
Introduction
The methods of working and the behaviour of members of Nanonat Control were
analysed for both quiescent and disturbed network Jonditions. T-he task analysis tool, the
form of observation followed by group question and answer sessions with each shift. The
questions were divided into two basic groups, one for quiescent conditions and one for
clisturbed network conditions. The responses from the! five shifts were almost identical
with some of the shifts expanding on one or two areas based on the Individual members
experiences in other utilities.
OV(;!Niew of the National Control Roam
ESKOM's National Control has a four control desks. One tor the shift supervisor and
three for!he controllers woo are responsible for;
II System frequency and'generator loading
• System voltages
• Transmission network state
The primary task of each shift Is to maintain the health of the netdork. re .~a.by
which the system state is determined are;
• System Prequency
• Voltage profile across the network
• Total system lasses
.. Automatic Generation Control performance
II Overall electrical security of the nelw')rk
The instantaneous state of the power sy. n is determined from the dibfJ'ays and alarm
messages sent to the controllers from tile RTUs,
Display Facilities
each desk is equipped with two or three 425 rnm (or 17 inch) high- solutlr,ii cciour
monitors, a Qwerty keyboard, dedicated statlon selection keybrC\fo and a mouse.
An audible tone is triggered when .evar a Breaker trips, This audible alarm has to be
Silenced manually by the control staff each time It is triggered.
Each controller has a dedicated telephone link to each regional control room, power
station and dlstrlbutlort station. He is thus able to contact all his customers directly and to
be contacted by staft fJ1 the field.
Along one wall of the control room is mimic or Map .Ioard. The Map,board Indicates the
state of all power lines belonging to National Control dynamically via light emitting
diodes. each Une has an embedded meter displaying the Instantaneous megawatt load
and its direction.
CRT Displays
j'he state of the power system is determined from the following displays available at
each workstation,
1. Station one-line displays
2. Station alarms pages
3. SYstem alarm message pages
4. System voltage page
5. . Tie·linf;l overviews
'S, Generation status display
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Station one-line
These operator displays are blrd's-eye model of the actual physical structure and layout
of a single pOW6r station or distribution station.
The one-line representatlon supports the abstract view and the bottom layer Of the
mental modell{sed by the control staff during daily operatlons. The order of the electrical
equipment on the display matches the physical arrangement at the station.
The graphical data on the one-line display is limited by character graphics functionality to
device states (breaker and link) and analog values. See fig 1 in appendix 7.
$tati~t'Alarm page
this is a tabular list of the status elements and their current state at the statton as
Indioated in Figure 3 d~\Appendix 1. The alarm points are displayed under the headings
of ~
• Communication Alarms
• Station Alarms
• Panel Alarms
The elements are displayed as a list since there is no other SUitable means of
representation on the one-line displays. The relationship of the alarm or status element
data is usually alphabetical.
It IS Important to note that tl:lere is no posltlon relationship between the alarm elements
and the points on the one-llne displays otner than by the name of the alarm will match
one of the electrical objects on the one-line display.
Alarm messages
When ever there is an unauthorised change of state in the network. the data acquisition
system or SCADA software notifies the control staff via message otherwise known as an
"alarm message", This can be Seen in Figure 3 of Appendix 7. At the same time the
corresponding element will reflect the new stale with a change of colour and shape or
text on the displays ..
Each alerm message consists of at least five fieldS;
o T .me Indicating when the event occurred
o Priority of the message
o Name of the station at which the state change occurred
o ..\ nne of the point changing state
Q 1he current state of the point
Alarm Bins
At national control all elements are associated with a device alarm bit'. This is in contrast
to the classical manner of displaying alarms by station.
Alarm bins are defined by the name of the device type. For example;
a Breakers (1 national and 3 regional)
'" Generator Unit Breakers
• Natlonal analog limit infringements
1 Regional analog limit infringements (we have three set of ret:1onfll alarm bins)
• Feeder 111"'1 or panel alarm bin:" (1 national and 3 regional)
• AGC alarms
• KV and freqllency limits
There are approximately 40 alarm bins in use on the eSKOM system at National Control.
The alarm bins are displayed in the two lines at the bottom of every display and are ~.
characters in length. A maximum of 20 bins can be Viewed at anyone time. ...
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Each desk is set up to reoetve a specific sub-set of the alarm messages. It is the
responsibility of the controller manning the desk to take the necessary action following
the arrival of the message. Each messages has then to be acknowledged and deleted.
System VQltage
This display provides the control staff with a complete list of all busbar voltages from
every station under national's control. Each station is listed vertically and the associated
voltages at the station are placed horizontally next to the station name. J
The stations on display are grouped by region rather than alphabetically as shown In
Figure 4 of Appendix 1.
Tie~lineoverview ')\ !/
These displays and the Mapboard afe the top layers of the mental model';.'~lsedby fifo
control staff to establish position relationships between the different stations in thfA'.)ower
network. See figure ~ In Appendix 7. //
//
The information on the tle-Hne displays is a subset of the data from all the ont1i;h1es
within the view area. The factors determining the size of the one-line subset [';1 display is
a function of the space allocated to each station. The smaller the space, th~')ess data
displayed per station. 1;/
/;
The control staff influence the design of the tieuline displays based on ttl/level of
abstraction needed for disturbance control and restoration. ///!
The various Man Machine Interface tasks carried out by the 5 man!~ift (four active and
one spare) for each of the four work areas are listed below; /: /
Stafftas/(s
Each shift has five members - four active and one Spare. Tj:'i;/actual tasks carried out by
each staff member depends upon which desk he is on. E~UI desk has its own
responsibilities. The scope of this task analysis is limiie>l::a) the MMI actions related to
the USeof the National controt computers and not to V,;.:! full range of responsibilities.
Details are included where applicable to MMI interapt.6n of other activities.
The individual tasks for each of the four desks ~r~~r quiescent conditions are;
Supervisor
Continuously monitor the overall state orr)power network and the performance of shift
members using the system displays. O{f)t guidance and assistance to the shift members
when required. ,.
The primary outputs for the Shift supervisor are;
Ii Sufficient generation
8 Valid load flow
• Optimised loading
• Acceptable vol~age profile
• Short term contingenoy plan
.. Accurldte Morning report
• Secure power system
During disturbances make decisions on system restoration, liaise with management on
the state of the power system. Once the disturbance has started and after the system has
settled down he has to;
• Determine the Cause of the disturbance
• Inform management of the event and the scope of the damage.
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II Determine the sequence of events
.. Start rest9ra~i(1),@
II Write up Hie Incideliit report
To fin(;) out th~ ~~tgll~,(!)f J:iilt>faull his only source of information is the alarm logs and the
one-llns diSI1>J~lY!?£Pi:§Q~ssiqlils with field staff assist in isolating the exact problem but this
IJ5,uaUytakes r:lIace after the system has settled down.
Frequenay Control
Tht~tg:s~ involye:s th~ frequenoy of the power system. The primary display used to
monlt&1t1tb'e,gelll11ijfatloA 15 the AGe display Shown in Figure 6 of Appendix 7.
Iitthl'l~lt!:r'b~nlil!1inUj~equlescenf tasks are;
IililSul!!~'tfuiaUJtl:!i"$Y$'tem frequency is kept at 50.00 Hertz.
of coet reserves at the various power stations to achieve the.towest
using the economic dispatch program
is suffiolent spinning reserve for the Automatic Generation Control
use in the event of an unexpected losses of generation.
is al,,,vaylS sufficient plant avaiiable for the next 24 ~48 hours.
of control and the rest of the shift on the current state of the
sUpply at the power stations.
the power stations on actual and potential loss of generation particularly in
o:f "ri$k~of-tr'ip" activities on a generating unit or feeder.
involves getting the power from the power station to the distribution stations.
by minute quiescent tasks are;
after the security of the network by ensuring that there are multiple connections
belWeEmthe different stations in the power network.
Authorl!';EI the handing over equipment to the regions for maintenance.
• 00 the necessary switching of lines in accordance with daily mamtenance schedule.
• Where possible ensure that the system voltages are at there correct levels.
• Read, understand. aoknowledge and delete all the alarms sent to work station CRT.
ill Call out maintenance staff to investigate and correct problems highlighted by the
alarm messages.
lti!)lta.§e Control
The primary task Is to ensure that the system voltages are kept at there correct values
following any network switching or any change in generation. This is particularly relevant
when the transmlsslon desk is very busy or there has been a sudden loss of generation.
The role of the voltage controller considered to be the most cruolal of all the tasks in the
control room.
The quiescent activities are;
• Monitor all the system voltages.
• Monitor the state of voltage control equipment such as reactors and capacitors and
switch them in and out as required.
• Monitor the tap posltlons of all transformers and change them if required
SCADA DeSign
In principle SCADA is designed to report the change of state of every point monitored by
the system. This theory of operation is based on the assumption need to be informed of
what is happening
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Pi~tl/.r:btJnr;~ceJ/Jliti~l!~t::~" ".~;:::.. I:. i!!~t~! )'~? ; .,. •
Durin€! ~ dislurrpafiToe,tbe qtj[eso-ent tasks still oontlnue but added them are the problems ,-c:>
oHhe drsfurb.~a ~ystem. .
:"-.::,:>
o:rrue¢diliJ;~··.Q.~tl\lf:li~alitiq(:'l·~~t~I~$i!~.r,Iil'eC;(lmEls·~ltr~,:'I'eI1t,two phasesof activity take place. on
. on th.e other is behaviour and aotiyity of the (I
~~tmI~l~11~l(3,~~~E..e and e~e~d of the<problem.
pf atarm messages sent to all control staff
from the area of concern at the crucial moment
dU~to increased alarm load and display demand.
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Appendix 4 MMIfunctionality comments
Introduction
This appendi* Q'ontains the eomments made by the control staff on t<Jpics related to their
daily activity While using the Character Graphics Man Machine Interface. These
comments are in response to the questionnaire sent to aU the shifts.
To Ic Comments b National Control staff
Alarming in general, Alarm
Pa e la out and content.
Aftefa fallover, an the 120 comms alarms are re-output, both in alarm and
"refqrn to norma! - Questipn - why cant the exceptions be reported?
NMd to be able to mark or reserve alarms to prevent them from being
d'(~'letedb aocldent,
to be able to move directly to the station name mentioned in the
essa e. Not have to use the system menu.
l~ybetween the audible alarm and the display of the Breaker
"atatl'll messa es Is far too Ion
F'i:rfto many unnecessary alarms, each of which has to be acknowledged
, ((leleted - .articular! durin a disturbance .
. are alarm messages sent to National Control from manned stations
le·~F[)rakensburg). '
Why cant the Hydro and Gas station alarms be sent to the Loading or
Fre uenc desk instead of the Transmission desk
There is a constant number of nuisance alarms generated by th.o Hydro
and Gas stations ~can these not be eliminated?
There are an enormous number of false alarms- need to prevent (hem at
the RTU.
General roblerns with the transformer alarms from lnqa ane
Need se uence of event data if ossible from the RTUs.
'G€~~~~mr::ITi'1p)flroOfbiiile;rmn;s~TTrco;oo~mTliUL«c}ii.hiltr;;imi1ie~.'iiSsss:PpeBin1ttruacknowledgIng a d deleti g alarms messages than
fix;n the roblem durin disturbances.
PageS and pages of frequency alarms are generated each time the
freauenc moves in and out of limits durlnQ a disturbance.
Following a disturbance, once the basic cause of the problem has been
found the remaining alarms are ignored and deleted. The problem with
doing this is that an important alarm message may be missed in the heat
of the moment. Need a better way to display alarm data in eneral.
I Navigation - Need to be able to move to the station one-line display from any place in
which the station nam~ is displayed.
When traversing a menu M preference is for automatic wrap around at the
top and bottom
Definite need for cordless mice to drive the disela}' call-up,
On dual headed consoles would like the cursor to move from CRT to CRT
automatically when moving_ off the screen bounda!y. --Need geographic map indicating physical layout of stations and lines
Need global indication map - on demand I to indicate current view in
system overview display.
IAutomatic ~enel'ation Control Need to be able to base load a whole power station at the same time and
to cancel the reguest during a low freguencll incident. _
On standby display need colour change In the sent-out-megawatt values if
the value changes b~ more than 5%
Very big need for capability diagrams of all generating units
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l)
IMapboard Need to Indicate on the Mapboard that. live line maintenance is in
.Pfqgress,.
like direct access to station one line displays from dedicated push buttons
rather than from a CRT menu.
1,-.;..T~le~.I.:.:.;;n~e_;:o",-r..;;_ov..:;..;·e;;.;.r..;;.;vj:.;:.ew.:.;.._;:q;.:.;;iS:J:;p~lla:LYls=-.•-+ ;..N~.o~tl1appY.~lth the exi$ting 6 page (2x3) overview displays
Would prefer to have system overview display match the Mapboard layout.
Have four or five display pages horizontally rather than 2 by 3 that don't
line up with the Ma"",p~b~oa~rd;;;,;',--:--~-:--:,:_:,;-__ ~~---""",,----;
Need to indicate live line work on the tie-lines
Need to be able to Indicate split busbars at a station
Need to indicate when a feeder is not-in-service
Need to indicate helicopter line spraying,
Need to be able 'to access additional data on demand from the RTU about
the state of the protection and group alarm details following Breakers,
Transformers, svc etc, problems.
Provlde intelligent and look ahead spelling checks when entering station
name data to avoid text ent roblems
Get consistency for all data entry activity (Tag and NIS have are not
consistent.
Need to move the manually entered data for the regions o"t.:>separate lists
to reduce the time it takes to find national data,
Be able to ente ..text Of information against a point and to have an
indication of the message on demand and prior to issuing a control to the
device
Provide indication of live-line work and helicopter washing on the overview
dis la s
Provide the ability to inhibit all the alarm elements at a device and an
entire electrical oblect, e. ,a feeder, enerator or transformer etc.
@uQerYisoty CO_9trol Indicate that the SuQervisory Inhibit state Of a device on the one-line
Before allowing a control to be sent to a device, display any operator
entered notes in a pOIJUDwindow
Provide the ability to cross check parallel lines prior to issuing a control, if
r-M~line is alread~ oQenwarn the controller'
Warn the controller if he is tripping the wrong breaker of a set of double
lines after opening one end,
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Appendix 5 Static VAR. Compensator
Introduction
Sample of Status and Analog element data available from a static VAR. Compensator.
This device is a good example of the phase three protection scheme that uses digital
inputs fed directly to the ERTU from the protection equipment that monitors and protects
the whole Compensator.
Signal Description RTU RTU Pin No.
Digital Inputs Plug
No,
SVC OFF (COMMAND 1) PBi C32
SVC ON (COMMAND 1) PB1 C31
SVC OFF (STATUS) ~HIGH PBi C30
SVC ON (STATUS) ~LOW PBi C29
SVC TRIP (COMMAND 1) PBi C28
'AAISE,VOLTAGE SET POINT {COMMAND 1} PBi C27
LOWER VOLTAGE SET POINT (COMMAND 1) PBi C26
RAISE REACrlVE OUTPUT (COMMAND 1) PBi C25
LQWER RE;ACTIVEOUTPUT (COMMAND 1) PBi C24
MANUAL CONTROL SELECTION_(POMMAND 1) PBi C23 -~
AUTOMATIC CONTROL SELECTION (COMMAND 1) PB1 C22.
MANUAL CONTROL SELECTION (STATUS) PBi C21
AUTOMATIC CONTROL SELECTION (SrATUS) PBi C20
MASrER TRIP MAIN (-K9) PB1 C7
MASTER TRIP BACK..UP (~K19) PBi C6
TNS $WITCH(-S1~ IN TEST POSi"!;lON PBi C5
SPARE ,.-"
SPARE
CONTROL SYSTEM SLOPE RAISE {COMMAND 1} PB4 C30
CONTROL SYSTEM SLOPE LOWER (COMMAND 1) PB4 C29
CAPACITIVP- DYNAMIC RANGE (SrATUS) PB4 C28
REACTIVE DYNAMIC RANGE (STATUS) PB4 C27
AUXILIARY AC SUPPLY ESKOM (STATUS) PB4 C26
AUXILIA~Y ACSUPPLY AUX. TRANSFORMER (STATUS} PB4 C25
MMI CONTROL SYSTEM HEALTHY PB4 C24
MMI CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE PB4 C23
AUXILIARY AC SUPPLY UNHEALTHY PB4 C22
AUXILIARY AC SUPPLY FAILURE TRIP ~ PB4 C21
EXPANSION UNIT FAILURE ~_~4 _~20
HV VT MCB'S TRIPPED F C19
VALVE ROOM 1 AIRCON {ALARM} ~1PL cfa
r¥:~LVEROOM 2 AIRCON {ALARM} PB..,. 6:1'7
CHARGER 1 FAILURE AC PB4 C16
~~GER 2 FAILURE AC PB4 CiS
CHARGER 1 FAILURE DC PB4 C14
CHARGER 2 FAILURE DC PB4 C13
CHARGER 1 DC SYSTEM ABNORMAL PB4 C12,
CHARGER 2 DC SYSTEM ABNORMAL PB4 C11
DC BOARD 1 DC FAIL PB4 C10
DC BOARD 2 DC FAIL PB4 C9
DC BOARD 'I DC ABNORMAL PB4 C8
DC BOARD 2 DC ABNORMAL PB4 C7
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Appendix 0 G,lossary
The following are explanations of words and abbreviations used In the document.
Alarm processing
Bay Processor
16KR or B.'eaker
Communication
Lim~loading
Communication
processing
5 July, 1995
//
This, is the service provided by the ALARM program to all other software
modules in the computer system. Applications needing to alert the control staff
of specific alarm conditions, S€lndthe ALARM program the necessary values as
parameters in a messaq« packet. Tht ALARM program unpacks the values,
builds up the AnCIl text according to predefined structures and places the text
message in the appropriate buffer.
Th~ MMI detects the existence of new messages In the buffers and re-dlsplays
the ALARM buffer name in the bottom line of ail displays. To see the alarm text,
the centro' staff select the buffer name and the appropriate alarm message"
display is sent to the screen. The control staff then acknowledge and delete the
alarms once they have read them.
In high voltage substations there are S() many signals that it requires a
dedicated computer to handle and record all the changes taking place for each
electrical object such as a feeder, transformer, etc, Figure 2-3 show the
relationship between the individual Bay Processors and the ERTU.
The word "bay" comas from the physical structure and location at the substation
In which the feeder Is installed. Thus tile pro: sssor associated with a particular
feeder, is referred to as the "bay processor",
A large switch used to turn on and off the electricity at the power stations and
distribution stations.
The general terms usee!to indicate the state of the breaker are tripped (open)
and closed (on). A breaker Is operated eilher manually, remotely from a control
room or automatically by protection equlprnent,
The overall communication line loading for a single comms line or channel Wa
function of : j,
l\l/
• The number of RTUs on the communications line
., The number of grQUpaddresses per RTU
., The rate at which each group Is scanned
• The number of data bits per group
II The number of interlaced control requests Sent to the RTUs
The cornrnunlcatlc, '.lIne loading should not exceed 80% of the maximum line
carrying capacity IVI anyone cycle period. The period Is determined by the scan
Interval of the gr/ ap with the lowest priority. The 80% limit Is Important If the
qUAlity of the communications lines are poor and there are a large number of
retries needed to cater for missing or lost data. Later versions of software
incorporate algorithms to maxhntse the data acquisition rate so as to aVoid
inactive periods while k'~eplng the line load below 80%.
Due to the limited bandwidth in the communications links, there are usually 6 to
8 RTUs per circuit, set up In a party line fashion.
Each communications link also provides alternate communications paths to
another 6 to 8 RTUs should the primary communications link fall. The
maximum number of RTUs per party line was determined by the vendor and
the data loading, l.e, the data quantities at each remote required to be scanned.
Each RTU, depending upon the RTU vendor, would have up to 64 unique group
addresses which would allow between 300 and 400 bits of data per group
App~ndil( II ..GIO$$ilry
DAQ
Data Base
Data processing
\\
EMS
ERTU
ESTEL
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address to be sent back to the Host per scan. The hlstorlcal restrictions being a
oornblrtatlon of the baud rate the Host computer functionality and power.
TM current SCADA systems make use of fibre optic communication links and
with the latest computer hardware the CPU power is not a problem for data
aoqulsltlon but is for the control staff, due to the quantities of data presented to
them. Historically, there w!'Jre in-buHt restrictions in both communications ability
and CPU resources, that limited the quantity of data that could be sent to the
Ho,st for processing from the RTUs.
rhese restrictions acted as a physical filter both to the data that could be
transmitted and the speed at which it arrived. These delays gave the control
staff time to breath and take stock of the situation during a disturbance. With
the faster and more powerful CPUs and better communications (via satellite
and fibre optics) the problem of data overloading becomes a very serious
indeed.
Data Acquisition. The process of moving data from the RTU to the Host
A storage area In the form of a tables used to hold the all the data needed by
the computer programs.
The data brought back by the SCAPA module, Is stored In a central data base.
The type and structure of the data base is vendor specific. The market does
tend to drive the deSign but currently it is determined by the needs of the tasks
that interface to It.
Since SOADA autlvity has to run in real time. all 110 to the SCADA data base
has to be as fast as possible, Thus, the design of the data case is around the
storing of the latest data from the RTUs and not the ease of maintenance. In a
large real time process control system, there are many different data bases
usually one per application. The vendor provides means of cross linking data
between the data bases to avoid duplication .
.It is the responsibility of the SCADA software to determine what has changed at
the RTU by comparing the current scanned data with the previous scan and
Issuing the appropriate text message to the ALARM program for any changes
detected. The text messages are usually hard coded and there Is little or no way
the control staff can verify the accuracy of the majority of the messages, short
of sending a someone out to the station to get confirmation that the message is
valid.
The data coming back from the RTU can only be Identified by its group address
and an asscclated Index. Currently there Is no additional processing done to
confirm the validity 1.7the message received from the SCADA system.
Depending upon what has changed. it Is sometimes possible to verify the
reported action by observed changes in associated elements of the power
network.
Energy Management system. The abbrevtatlon used in the Electrical Industry
to reter to the complete supervisory and control computer system used in the
monitoring and control of an Integrated power system.
Enhanced Remote Terminal Unit. It is similar to the standard RTU but contains
on board computers that provide additional functionality over and above the
RTU.
ESKOM Standar£J Telecommunications Protocol. This protocol was designed
and specified by ESKOM to avoid the problems of being locked Into proprietary
Appendix 6 •Glossary
lAP
Interconnected
Power System
MMI ..
M," Mauh'i:n,1\)
Interfa~e•/)
One ..line display
).1
Periodic Oata
Acquisition
Protection
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c vendor' communication hardware anc sottware. The ESTeL Pf9tocol is based
on the Open Systems Intaroonneot Reference Model (OSI-RM), developed by
the Internattona! st~ndards Organisation (1$0) and CCITT. The protocol uses
the OUftent internatIonal Telecontrol standards proposed by the IEC.
Intelligent Ala,nn Processor. A software program used to summarise the
result$ of multiple al€lrm. messages and reduce the number of messages sent to
control staff. They aria usually "rule" based which makes them very expensive
to mlilintain tn a ol1anging environment.
leleotrloity Is transmitted from power stations to distribution stations and to
ijo:n&drnSts at dIfferent voltages. The National Control Centre is only concerned
wlUHne lill'strlbutlon of power above 132 KV. Voltages below 132 KV are the
!fespoflsibU1ty of the regional distri.bution stations,
c. The power network above 132 KV Is referred to ('IS the Interconnected Power
System or Main Transmission System.
This OaVElrsboth the h~rdware and software used by control staff to monitor and
contrOl the integrated power system. II'l general terms it refers to the method
and means of exchanging Information between a parson and a machine. it
primartly encompasses the method of displaying data on. a computer screen.
The primary reason why data is brought back from the RTU is to allow Control
staff to "See" what is happening at the remote site. This is done via the Man
Maohlne In{erface,(MMI). ,
The MMI up until quite recently was limited to character graphic CRTs that
~~ovlded apout 96. possible shapes apart fromthe ncrmr' alphabet In 7 or 8
dQlours~_TM electrlcallnd'>lstry Is in the process of moving towards what is know
as FuJI CZlraphios. In which the conventional CRT Is replaced by a desktop
wQrkstatlon offering Pan, Zoom, aeclutter, Popup windows and Pull down
menus.
The displays built with these tools have up to 32 000 colours and the user
creates the Shapes required from the simple primitives of clrcle, Box, Polyline
etc,
At present the development of the Full Graphics MMI is still It its infancy and it
will be a number of years before formal trends and needs have been Identified
and Incorporated into the control rooms.
A blrd's eye view of a single substation drawn symbolically. Figure 7-4 is an
example of iii one-line diagram.
During "periodlc" data acquisition, the Host requests speoltlc pre-defined data
sets or groups of data from the RTU pre-set Intervals.
All groups at the RTU are scanned at different rates depending upon the data
type and the rate at which data changes. Obviously the faster the better! The
data In each group Is transferred to the Host Irresll6ctive {If what it1f)S changed
at the RTU. This is an overkilfln one way but during a disturbance the
communlcatton line loading does not change where as the Host prQoes:~lng
does. .
All electrical equipment used by utilities Is protected against faults that can
potentially destroy It. A protection scheme has two parts, th~ detection
eq·jipment and the physical method of interrupting the electric ":', TM detection
equipment uses the rate change In voltage and current to determine where the
fault Is located and acts to trip'the breakers nearest to the fault.
Appendix G • Glossary 3
Phase 3 protection
Polled exception
reporting
Power Application
Software
PLC
Prototype
RTU
Remote Terminal
Unit
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.Electronic rather than physical protection sensing equipment used by ESKOM
'to protect !lJe power system from faults. This form of protection does not rely on
mechanical relays to determine the existence of a fault. The PHASE 3
electronic protection equipment lnterraces directly to the Bay processor RTU.
The data at the RTU is divided in to a number of categories (between 2 and 8).
The Host initiates (fata transfer from the RTU by sending a "request for
changes" message, specifying the category of data it is expecting.
If the RTU has any changes to report for the seJ~cted category, then the
change, identified by its group address and in(.l~x into the group is dispatched.
This same pddressing structure is matched at the Host which decodes the
change message and produces the appropriate canned message for the MMI.
If no elements have changed In the requested category the RTU returns a "no
data" response.
Once all the RTUs have peen upolled" for the current category the next
category Is processed until it Is time to start over again.
The RciUs are polled at least once a second depending on the baud rate and
the amount of data returned to the Host. It becomes obvious that he line
loading will change considerably during a disturbance for "exceptl.:!n" reporting
as will the Host processing.
Software used to carry out "what-W' studies of different states of the electrical
network as weI! the automatic control Of generator output,
/'
Programmable Logic Controller, a device In which a series of rrogrammed
commands C;flnbe Inserted. The device is used to control industrial plant, In the
Case of a feeder, all the functions that would have required physical relays are
replaced by logical relays In the PLC. The PLC outputs are usecjo drive the
physical plant to match fUnctions sent to the Pl_C from the ERTU.
A model of the real thing 1 mainly used to testing ideas
A Remote Terminal Unit, Is an electronic devices Situated at a power station 01'
distribution station. This. device acts as a link between the plant and the SCADA
system. It is the interface between the plant and the Energy Control computer
system situated at the control centre. An RTU Is connected to tho eleotrical
equipment via optically isolated wiring. (The optical Isolation is to prevent fault
currents and induced high voltages destroying hIghly sensitive low Voltage RTU
equlpment.)
The Host communications to and from tho RTU are provided by various means
e.g. Microwave links, Power Hne carriers and Telephone qata Circuits,
The older RTUs are made up Of a number of standard hardware components
such as:
• Host request address decoding arid requested data export
4¥ Status "Ilputs (from 1 to I; bit valu~~~)
• Analogue inputs (8 to 16 bit dJ1lues)
• Host"Qpmputer contf:?1 request, execution
" AC9'amulated power measuterrients (12 to 32 bit values)
• Communications channel selecnon hardware
• PC 1/0 connections
• Power supply
Electrical equipment status inputs are interfaced to the RTU at various v\)lta~e
and current levels such as 2Q mllll amp current loops. (Field bus protocol rs
AppendiX ~ • Glossary 4
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an appearance though there appears to be a reluctance by
$ to offer it,}
"
R.TUs, Measurement or t4Al1alogue" inputs are converted to digital
a $i;lared Analogue to Digital converter in the RTU just prior to the
,-,1!l.a'li!ell1lgtelemetered to the Host computer,
RTU designs, the RTU Is not longer a hard wired inaotive device
actuall'W a powerful micro processor with considerable facilities.
rhe~e faofUties allow it to provide a number of additional functions and to add
valt,te to the data sent to the Host. It is this, so f~r, unused capability that can
greatly change the way SCADA systems operaW.;n the fyture.
For example the latest generation of RTUs process an input data from the yard
every rnllll-seoond, They have their own data base into which all status and
analogue values are stored ip digital form. This allcws the RTU to do limit
cheoking em the analogues ahd advise the Host of the fact when an Analogue
has exoeeded limits or Is In an alarm statel
The general name that refers ~othe process of obtaining data from an RTU or
e~TU. Electrical Utilities (such'~s ESKOM) are monitored and controlled via
computer based Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) facilities
'from a central control room.
Simulator
The Substations and Power Stations comprising the power network are IInkecl to
the control room via a network of cornmunloatlons clrcults in a radial mode. The
state of equlpment in the power network is retrieved anc:,ctelivered to the central
computer via the "Data Acquisition" part of the SCA011 module.
When the control staff need to alter the, state of an electrical element. such as a
Sreoker, they send a control signal to the Breaker Instl'Uctitlg it to Change state,
The control message is delivered to the deVice by the "Supervisory Control"
part of the SCADAmodule.
Ttmsihere are two distinct parts to SCADA, firstly the acquiring of network data
and the subsequent supervisory control of the network objects.
A device used to emulate an active industrial process wlthout the risk of
damaging real plant,
Similar to one- line displays but showing inter-station connection data from
many stations. The tie line data includes power flows, Voltages and breaker
states for all stations on display. There are tie-line displays for all regions in the
power network.
l·ie ..Line Displays
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Figure 1
Appendix 7 Copies of displa'ys from the ESKOM control system
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: One-line display of the Drakensburg pump storage station.
The top of the display indicates the electrical configuration and the state diagram at the
bottom show the current modes of the four units.
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Figure 5
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.A..Qpr::NDIX1 ..COPIES OF DlSPLAYS
: This is a typical regional Tie-line display indicating the MW line flows and various
voltages of the stations, The solid rectangles indicate closed breakers, holl!;Jwones show
that the breaker is open. .
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